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In this thesis I consider three theories of representation.
From the most important of these, Piaget's theory, specific successes
and failures of infant representational ability can be predicted.
A series of experiments designed to test certain aspects
of that theory are accordingly reported. In Experiments I - TV,
young infants (aged 3-16 weeks) were found to have a limited
ability to imitate the eight models of movement shown to them. In
Experiment V it was found that older infants, by contrast, were unable
to imitate a novel hand and arm movement. In Experiments VI - VIII
infants and young children were not immediately successful in a task
in which literal and pictorial representational information had to be
used to solve the problem.
The discovery that young infants were able to imitate certain
models is irreconcilable with the evidence from the classic studies
on smiling, which indicate that the young infant's ability to
discriminate adult features is not sufficiently well developed to
allow for imitation. In this thesis, I report the results of a study
of smiling which show that young infants can discriminate adult features,
supporting my contention that imitation is possible. Smiles in
visually impaired and in blind infants were compared in form with those
found in normal infants. Presence and absence of particular form
changes seem to indicate that some aspects of the smile are learned,
possibly through imitation.
The inplication of these results for theories of representation
outlined are discussed, and possible models of imitative behaviour
considered.
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CHAPTER I
THEORIES OF REPRESENTATION
Piaget's theory and observations of the function of imitation in
the development of representation, are of inestimable value to any
investigation of imitation. It is essential then to describe that
theory of the emergence of representation. However, before considering
Piaget's and other theorists' views of representation in infancy,
"representation" itself must be defined.
Representation in one sense is understood as an act of evocation
of an absent image or object. When an infant successfully reproduces
the action of a model, when that model is no longer present, then
representation in this first usage must obviously be taking place.
Representation is commonly understood in another sense, as an
image or symbol which exhibits the counterpart of some material object
or idea. When an infant can understand that a picture or word actually
denote a particular object, then representation in this sense is
understood.
PIAGET'S THEORY
"Representation begins when there is simultaneous differentiation
and co-ordination between 'signifiers' and 'signified'. . The first
differentiations are provided by imitation and the mental image derived
from it, both of which extend accommodation to external objects. The
meanings of the symbols, on the other hand, come by way of assimilation,
which is the dominating factor in play and plays an equal part with
accommodation in adapted representation.
... The constitution of the symbolic function is only possible as
a result of this union between actual or mental imitation of an absent
model and the 'meanings' provided by the various forms of assimilation.
Then it is that language, a system of collective signs, becomes possible."
2.
(Piaget 1945/62).
I have given this somewhat lengthy quotation in full, because I
believe it to be Piaget's clearest statement on the development of
representation in both the senses outlined above. Representation is
not possible in the first sense until the infant can show imitation of
an absent model, as the image only becomes available when this capacity
has been developed. Representation in the second sense is not evident
until imitation has provided the first differentiations, when the
symbols acquire meaning through play. When both these forms of
representation are devdlcped, language acquisition may proceed.
Piaget defines his use of representation as
"The capacity to evoke by a sign or a symbolic
image an absent object or an action not yet
carried out" (Piaget 1936/53),
where a sign is a collective arbitrary symbol, such as a word, and a
symbol is a mental image.
Piaget holds that representation is not possible in the sensori¬
motor period.
"At the level of groping, representation does not
precede action and does not even directly result
from it." (Piaget 1936/53)
Because the infant in this stage is restricted to direct co-ordinations
of actions, mental imagery is not possible. '.Then an infant uncovers
an object in order to strike it (Piaget, 1936, 53 Obs. 129), the infant
need not picture the object before uncovering it. The familiar sensor-
motor schema of striking objects is sufficient to lead him to his shoey
with which he is often used to strike objects. Piaget illustrates the
unlikelihood of mental imagery being present in the 3ensor~motor phase
with reference to his observations on the characteristic errors
obtained in object permanence tasks, which could hardly occur if the
infant had access to an image of the vanished object (Piaget and
Inhelder, 1966/71). He also illustrates this with reference to the
problem of pulling a stick through the bars of a cot, when it is
presented horizontally against the bars (Piaget, 1936/53 CTbs. I62-I63).
The child persists in pulling the stick against the bars, and cannot
intentionally adjust the angle of the stick to allow it to pass through
the bars. This would be inexplicable if the child could form a mental
image of how the stick should be adjusted.
Although symbols are not available to the child in the sensori¬
motor phase, there are certain cues which Piaget terms "indices" and
"signals" which permit "provision" of* events independent of action
itself (Piaget, 1936/53)» seen in instances of anticipation of events.
However, these predecessors of the true signifier cannot be classed as
true symbols. The symbolic image can only be formed when the schemata
begin to function in mental assimilation and accommodation.
"The mental image ia a product of the internal-
isation of the acts of intelligence" (Piaget,
1936/53).
Pot Piaget, the bridge between sensoid-motor representation and
operational representation is imitation.
"... imitation, first altered and interiorised,
indubitably constitutes the starting point of the
mental image" (Piaget, 1967/71).
Piaget argues that the capacity of the child to reproduce the actions of
others externally, by imitating them, leads to the capacity to imitate
these internally. In imitating a model no longer present, the external
model has been replaced by an "internal model" (Piaget, 1945/62). This
internal model takes the form of an image, and thus constitutes the
first signifier, indicating that representation has developed. However,
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"The image must in some way be acted before
it is thought" (Piaget, 1936/53)*
Prom this it follows that the imitation precedes the image, and not
that the image is followed by the act of imitation.
As progress is made in the development of representation through
imitation, the continuation of accommodation, so play, the
continuation of assimilation also develops (Piaget, 1945/62). During
the sixth stage of the development of intelligence, because of the
progress of representation brought about by deferred imitation, "Eudic
symbols", which involve representation first appear. These presage
the appearance of representation inthe second sense described above.
Thus at the age of 15 months J. was observed to "sleep" on "pillows"
which were in fact the collar of a coat, the tail of a rubber donkey,
etc. (Piaget, 1945/62 Obs. 64).
Piaget believes that in every Ludic symbol can be found represent¬
ational imitation. With the systematic acquisition of language, however,
these symbolic schemas can be projected on to new objects. Thus after
the age of 18 months <1 was observed to make her hat cry, and feed a
doll with a shell (Piaget 1945/62 Obs. 75a).
Imitation, then, provides the first signifiers, ledding to
the formation of symbols, as mental images and ludic symbols. This
development in representation constitutes the beginning of the semiotic
function, which allows for the development of language. The importance
cf imitation in Piaget's theory of representation cannot therefore be
overestimated.
ERUNBR'S THEORY
Bruner, who defines representation as
"A set of rules in which one conserves one's
encounters with events" (Bruner, 1966a)
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has proposed that there are three modes of representation, or kinds
of representational systems. These are
"enactive representation, iconic representation and
symbolic representation - knowing something through
doing it, through a picture or image of it, and through
some symbolic means such as language" (Bruner 1966a).
The iconic and symbolic modes of representation thus correspond
to the two definitions of representation presented above.
Bruner argues that these three modes of representation evolve in
the order in which they were described. Their development is not stage¬
like, but one of successive mastery, with the partial translation of
each its successor.
In the sensorimotor period enactive representation prevails, and
Bruner uses Piaget's descriptions of infant behaviour to illustrate
his concept of that representation. At this stage percept and action
are poorly differentiated, but the infant "defines" the percept by the
action. Bruner admits that the description of action patterns as
modes of representing events remains obscure (Bruner, 1966a).
Iconic representation becomes possible when
"perception becomes autonomous or relatively
autonomous from action" (Bruner, 1966a).
5y the end of the first year of life the child is well ,on the way towards
this accomplishment (Bruner, 1966b). The transition from enactive to
iconic representation is characterised thus:
"an objectivised form of imagery taking over as the
prevailing mode of summarising behavioural space,
rather than behavioural space being represented by
kinesthetic or proprioceptive patterns"(Bruner,
1968).
Bruner agrees with Piaget's emphasis on
"the origin of imagery in action" (Bruner, 1968)
which may indicate that he sees the image as a product of interior ised
imitation. Because of the difficulty of obtaining information as to
the nature of the young child's images, he hypothesises that from
reports of older children's perceptual organisation
"non-schematised imagery is highly characteristic
af early intellectual operations" (Bruner, 19b6b).
Bruner and his co-workers in a long series of studies have shown
how the child moves from an iconic mode of representation to a symbolic
mode (Bruner et. al 1966). For Bruner, however, symbolic representation
is not simultaneous with the emergence of speech, since
"only slowly does (the child) learn to relate the
language he speaks to his thoughts about things,
to order his representation of the world by the
syntactical logic inherent in his speech" (Bruner, 1966a).
Symbolic representation can only be said to be present when the child
knows not only the referents of words, but the rules for forming and
transforming utterances.
Bruner proposes that the "impulsion" to cognitive growth, to move¬
ment from 6ne mode of representation to another, is conflict or contra¬
diction.
BOWER'S THEORY
For Bower, perception is a process of representation, (Bower, 1978).
Representations are "models of reality" (Bower and '.Yishart, 1978)
according to this theory.
These models are "internal descriptions" of events. They are
formed through the processes of perception, which in the young infant
is abstract in nature. Thus the representations of events in the
world which the young infant attains are also abstract (Bower, 1978).
Bower conceives of development as a process of differentiation, whereby
the original abstract perceptions of the infant give rise to abstract
representations. As perception becomes more specific, and less abstract,
so do the representations the infant constructs become less abstract
and more specific (Bower and Wishart 1978). Bower defines his use
of "abstract" and "specific" within the Theory of Types proposed by
Russell (1910), where statements are classified into types according
to the level of specificity and level of logic.
Bower argues that evidence from research on perceptual and cognitive
development indicates that during development the infant's internal
descriptions of events do move from being abstract and less differentiated
to being specific and move differentiated.
To illustrate his theory in perceptual development Bower (1978)
cites a study by Day and McKenzie (1973) on short-term perceptual
learning in young infants. Infants were shown a cube in a certain
orientation for 10 trials of 20 seconds each, and of course they habit¬
uated. If the infants were instead shown the same cube in different
orientations for 10 trials, then they habituated at the same rate.
Photographs of the cube in different orientations did not produce
habituation. This demonstration of shape constancy in young infants,
Bower argued, (1978) showed how abstract was the infants' representation
of an object. Their memory was of a cube, not of a cube in a specific
orientation; so when they saw that cube in a different orientation,
it was seen as being the same as the original cube. Y/hatever the nature
of the representation of the original cube the infants possessed, it
was non-iconic and abstract.
Bower cites a study by Caron et al. (1977) to support his theory
that the infant's representational system is not iconic; for in that
study, where 13 week old infants were presented with various shapes in
various orientations using an habituation paradigm, greatest recovery
to the test stimulus was found when both shape and slant of the
test stimulus were varied although the retinal image was the same.
Had the infants merely retained the iconic image of the habituated
stimulus there should have been no recovery to the test stimulus.
Bowerbelieves that the experiment reported by Bryant et al (1972)
also supports his view that initially representation is not iconic but
is abstract. It seems from their studies that by 8 months of age, havin
seen but not touched two objects, if one is put unseen into the infant's
hand and he is allowed to feel it, then when shown the two objects again
the infant can choose which of the two he felt. The objects in this
experiment were very similar, e.g. an allipsoid and an ellipsoid with
a small cut-out, and so the infant's representation of the object must
have been rather abstract, "rounded with a piece cut out" (Bower and
Wishart, 1978).
As an example of the move from abstract to specific representation
in cognitive development, Bower describes an experiment on object
permanence task performance in young infants (Bower, 1977a). Two
groups of infants were exposed to a tracking situation for different
periods of time before being tested on the standard Stage IV object
permanence task. The infants watched an object move along a track,
enter a tunnel and then reappear at the other end of the tunnel. The
infant's first discovery, according to Bower, is that the object can go
into the tunnel and still continue to exist. If at this point
he is transferred to the object permanence task he will succeed with
this task sooner than control infants do. Infants given longer practice
with the tracking before transfer also succeed with the object
permanence tasks earlier than do controls, but not as quickly as those
infants given less tracking practice.
Bower proposes that the infants given longer practice had specified
the original abstract description, into a rule of the form "to see an
object that has vanished at the left hand edge of the tunnel, look
for it at the right hand edge after x seconds". Bower suggests that
the infants given longer practice can only solve the problem by
"dredging from memory" the earlier, more abstract representation of
the task.
Bower suggests that the explanation for the seeming repetition of
earlier attainments given above applies to other repetitions in infancy
and childhood (Bower, 1977a). These repetitions occur when older
children give incorrect verbal answers to problems which younger children
can answer correctly (Mehler and Bever, 19&7; Maratsos, 1973)•
"When the verbal tests are first given, there has
not been enough time for the initial discovery to
have been specified to the extent that the child is
incapable of applying the discovery to other
situations. With older children however, the initial
discovery has been made highly specific. The
relation between the initial problem and the new
problem is therefore obscured" (Bower, 1978).
Again, the original discovery must be retrieved from memory.
To sum up, then, Bower believes that infants are capable of
representing events, in the first sense of representation I employed.
These representations are at first abstract, and with increasing
differentiation in development become more literal, more specific.
Representation in the second sense Bower discusses in the context of
the acquisition of word meaning (Bower, 1978). In the grov/th of
word meaning Bower argues that perceptual representations are made
public. Those which are made public are those demanded by the child's
particular communicational milieu. Word use will in addition reflect
the specificity of perceptual representation achieved. Given the
requisite environmental information then it would seem that for Bower
representation in this second sense is achieved in language.
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Summary of these theories of representation.
The three theories outlined, above are contradictory on the
question of representation in infancy. While Piaget does not believe
that the infant can represent in infancy, Bruner and Bower believe
that he can. Bruner believes that representation through action is
the only available mode. Bower, however, proposes that since infants
can perceive from birth they can form abstract representations from
birth.
In the period after sensori-motor development Piaget considers that
representation is achieved through the formation of images. Bruner
agrees with this position, but seems to place the beginning of iconic
representation earlier than Piaget does, at around 12 months of age.
Bower sees all development in representation as a process of differentiation
of the original abstract representations.
The emergence of the symbolic function antedates the acquisition
of language for Piaget. Bruner considers that symbolic representation
is not achieved until mastery of language is well advanced. For Bower,
language would seem to be simply another specification, where represent¬
ation becomes public instead of private.
Criticism of these theories, ana additional experimental evidence.
S.J. G-ibson (1969) has alleged that Piaget's contention that the
image follows the act of interiorised imitation poseS logical problems.
Bruner believes that Piaget's theoretical account of the separation of
action and percept is not explanatory (Bruner, 1966b). Cohen and Gelber
(1975) claim that there is little experimental evidence to support Bruner's
contention that the infant can represent events in action. Caron et al.
(1977) interpret their results, which Bower adduces as evidence of non-
iconic representation, as indicating that infants respond not to real
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shape and slant hut to the differential motion parallax of retinal
disparity cues common to the slanted stimuli. Bryant et al's
experiment cannot I believe be adduced as evidence of non-iconic
representation, since the infants saw the objects before being allowed
to feel them. They may have retained an iconic image of the seen
objects which allowed them to recognise the felt object.
Experimental evidence can be presented that infants may be capable
of representing events other than through action.
Bower (1966) showed that infants as young as six weeks cf age
anticipated the reappearance of an object when another was slowly moved
over to occlude and then disocclude it. Heart rate measures of
surprise were used. Infants were more surprised by reappearance than
non-reappearance if the occlusion time extended beyond a few seconds.
This result indicates that the infants were storing some representation
of the object, whether iconic or non-iconic.
The multitude of habituation studies conducted successfully with
very young infants would imply some representation of previous experience.
Since it is a decrease in the amount of looking behaviour which indicates
that information has been stored it would be difficult to interpret this
as enactive representation (Cohen and G-elber, 1975)•
That any such representation possible is quite specific by the age
of 3 - 4 months is apparent from studies reported by Saayman et al.
(1964) and Cohen et al. (1971). Using habituation paradigms they
found that infants could store information as to form and colour of
simple stimuli. Reco veiy was greatest when both dimensions were
altered, hov/ever, so representation was not necessarily iconic.
Operant conditioning experiments also demonstrate some evidence of
representation. If an infant learns to turn his head to obtain rein-
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forcement then over the succeeding trials the infant will tend, to
repeat that response (e.g. Lipsitt and. Siqueland, 1966). It is not
clear what the representation cf the response is, however. While
Piaget might claim it to he an instance of a "devic.e to make interest¬
ing things seen continue" (Piaget, 1945/62), Bruner would probably
claim it as an instance cf enactive representation, and Bower as a
specification of an originally abstract conception of the connection
between head movement and reinforcement.
Difficulties of interpretation cf particular experimental results
are obvious. However, it would be generally agreed that infant
imitation involves representation of the model's act. I will now




The term "imitation" is used to describe a range of extremely
diverse behaviours. There is no consensus on the nature of the processes
assumed to underline these heterogeneous behaviours. A chimpanzee
attempting to put lipstick on its mouth, a child kicking dolls after
seeing a fSn of another child doing so, an infant waving bye-bye, a
man impersonating a goldfish - all these are examples of imitation,
and there is no unitary theory to account for them all.
Imitation is usually defined as the act by which a model's aation
is reproduced. As G-ilmore (1967) has indicated, a theory of imitation
must be able to answer two fundamental questions® (l) how is an
imitative act performed? (2) how does a new response come to be
imitatively acquired?
IMITATION AS AN INSTINCTIVE TENDENCY
"Imitation is natural to man from childhood, one of his
advantages over the lower animals being this, that he is the
most imitative creature in the world, and learns at first by
imitation" (Aristotle : De Poetica)."
Aristotle's view of imitation as an innate tendency prevailed until
the beginning of the twentieth century, when the doctrine of instinct
fell into disrepute. McDougall (1908) seems to have been the last
psychologist to propound this view; he believed imitation to be a
social facilitator. Valentine (1930) distinguished two kinds of
imitation to circumvent the objection that a general tendency to imitate
would lead to innumerable daily instances of imitation. The first was an
instinctive tendency to imitate; the second "purposive imitation",
i_e. imitation of a means, understood as a means, and presumably therefore
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deliberate.
LEASHING- THEORIES OF IMITATION
As Parton (1976) has indicated, there are three main learning
theories of the genesis of imitation.
The first, and oldest, is the associationist view, which holds
that the contiguity between seeing a model and by chance producing
the same response is sufficient for response iteration. (Allport,
1924; Maccoby 1959).
The second is the discriminative learning view, which holds that
by chance a response similar to the one the model produced will be pro¬
duced and then reinforced. The probability of it re-occurring to
that stimulus will, therefore, be increased. The similarity between
the stimulus model's action and the response is merely fortuitous;
any other response could be reinfored with equal efficacy (Skinner,
A
1953).
The third is the conditioned reinforcement view^a variant of the
discriminative learning view. Imitation is established by chance
reproduction of the model's stimulus, but the primary reinforcement by
the model is superseded by the secondary reinforcement of making the
match.
The associationist viev7paint has been criticised by Piaget (1945/62),
who argued that haphazard contiguities would lead to all sorts of hap¬
hazard associations, which have not in fact been observed. Parton (1976)
has pointed out that if such contiguities were haphazard they would not
lead to associative strength between stimuli and mismatch because they
were likely to be infrequent. However, the question of how the infant
acquires novel responses not in his repertoire still remains unanswered
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by this theory (Bandura, 1969).
The discriminative learning view has been criticised on the grounds
that it cannot account for instances where imitation is not reinforced
by the adult, as in observational learning (Bandura and //alters, 19£>3)«-
In addition, Piaget (1945/62) has shown that such reinforcement training
is generally ineffective.
The conditioned reinforcement view can be criticised on the grounds
of inadequacy of explanation of the infant's ability to detect similarity
between his action and the stimulus. Bandura (1969) has also
criticised this theory on the grounds that imitation would be much more
widespread than it is if it were correct;, of numerous models on
numberless occasions.
PIAG-BT *:S THEORY OF IMITATION
Piaget views imitation as a phenomenon which itself develops, and
rejec-fc£
his theory explicitly learning models for the origin of
imitation. His is the only theory of imitation which is supported by
observations of infants, and is therefore the most important contribution
to this field.
Piaget defines imitation as "the act by which a model i3 reproduced",
and believes that no ability to represent the model is implied, since
it may simply be "perceived". (Piaget 1945/62). Piaget found that
the development of imitation parallelled the six stages in the growth of
intelligence he described earlier (Piaget 1936/53). Two conditions must
be met, according to Piaget, before imitation can occur. The first is
that the scnemas must be capable of differentiation when confronted
with the data of experience; the second, the model's behaviour must be
analagous to the results the infant has itself obtained, i.e. the model
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must be assimilated to a circular schema he has already acquired.
Thus, Piaget would not expect an infant to be capable of imitation
until the third stage of sensori-motor development, that of secondary
circular reactions.
In fact, it is not until that stage that Piaget finds evidence of
imitation; but because of the historical emphasis on the innatism
of imitation, he studied imitation from birth. The six: stages he
described are as follows
Stage I "Preparation through the reflex" (0 - 1 month)
Piaget found no evidence of imitation at this stage. His son,
wakened at night on the day he had been born, began to cry when he
heard other infants cry; but Piaget believed this to be the mere
starting of a reflex by an external stimulus. Either the infant
was unpleasantly affected by being woken, and so began to cry, or the
crying resulted from its repetition, with the infant confusing others'
cries with his own.
Stage II "Sporadic imitations" (l - h. months)
During this stage reflex schemas are broadened by the incorpor¬
ation of external elements as a result of experience. Reflex crying
is broadened into differentiated vocalisation for its own sake; the
first visual accommodations to moving objects are made. Piaget finds
evidence of the beginnings of imitation in phonation and vision.
Occasionally, from the age of one month, his son would vocalise after
Piaget had made some sound, without any attempt at differentiation,
- "vocal contagion". He would also reproduce sounds he had just made
when Piaget imitated him (mutual imitation); and at 2 and a half months
the infant imitated sounds which were in his repertoire, but which he
had not been heard to make immediately prior to the experiment. The
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infant only kept up this behaviour for a fortnight, after which time
only the "vocal contagion" and "mutual imitation" could be elicited.
This behaviour, true imitation, Piaget also observed once in one of
his daughters. This was, therefore, very exceptional, and the infants
never tried to imitate new sounds they could not themselves make.
In vision, too, some evidence of the beginning of imitation can be
found at this stage. At two and a half months of age, his daughter
clearly imitated an up-and-down movement of Piaget's head and then a
side-to-side movement. As for prehension, at three months cf* age, his
son clearly imitated his father's action when he separated and then
brought together his hands.
Piaget explains these instances of sporadic imitation as simply
continuation of movements of accommodation, when these are part of an
already formed circular reaction or of a general assimilatory activity.
When a child hears others making a sound, he attempts to have it repeated,
and because accommodation to the sounds is inseparable from the schema
of assimilation already formed, hearing the sound at once sets the
schema in motion. In the case of the head movements, exactly the same
obtains. In order to continue fco see the other person's, head moving,
all the child has to do is reproduce his own movements ,of accommodation.
As soon as the infant moves his own head, the other person's head seems
to be moving again. Similarly, in the case of prehension, the infant,
in watching his hands move accommodated his eyes to the movement and
assimilated that movement to a familiar schema (moving his own hands
together and apart). There is nothing mysterious about this, according
to Piaget. It is an example of recognitive assimilation, which is
indissociable from reproductive assimilation at this stage. The child
neither confuses the adults' body parts with his own, nor does he
necessarily distinguish them from his own. There can not, therefore,
"be any imitation of new actions at this stage.
Stage III "Systematic imitation" (4-8 months)
New models can be assimilated at this stage, but because the
secondary reactions are not co-ordinated one with the other, there
can be no accommodation to new models. Thus his infants would imitate
almost all the sounds they made spontaneously. The mechanism is the
same as that utilised in Stage II; the intention is to prolong
interesting events. During this stage, they would also imitate hand
movements for which they had schemas, but specific movements whih had
not been isolated from the schemas in which they occurred were no
better imitated than entirely new movements. Thus, movements of
grasping and of the fingers were imitated, but opening and closing the
hand was not imitated until the child herself had isolated this com¬
ponent of another schema and practised it herself. That there is no
spontaneous imitation of movements the infant cannot see himself make
is apparent, according to Piaget, from the observation that his infants
would not between 5 and 8 months imitate mouth movements (protruding
the tongue5opening the moUth, etc), except in specific situations.
One of these is the case of pseudo-imitation, where an action may be
imitated in a specific situation of "mutual imitation",^ i.e. the adult
imitates the infant, and the infant repeats his actions in order to
reproduce this interesting event. Such imitation tends not to last,
unless it is strengthened, oy a "continual show of approval" when it
may persist until assimilation begins with the progress of intelligence.
Stage IV "Imitation of movements already made by the child but which
are not visible to him (8-12 months)
This stage of sensori-motor development is characterised in
Piaget's theory as being that at which sohemas begin to co-ordinate
with each other, producing a system of "indices" relatively detached
from actual perception. In addition, the global relationships between
the secondary circular reactions concerning space, objects and causality
give way to the elaboration of relationships between things. The first
development enables the child to assimilate the movements of others'
bodies to his own body, even when he cannot see his own movements.
The second facilitates accommodation to new models. Thus at 8 months
his daughter imitated lip movements and tongue protrusion, movements
she had not been seen to make before the observations began, and which
of course she could not see herself make. During this stage Piaget
observed his children touching the finger to the nose, eyes and ears,
putting a finger in the mouth, opening and shutting the eyes. That
training was required for this systematic imitation of movements by
parts unseen he adduces from his observations of the errors his infants
made in their attempts to imitate - opening and closing the hands instead
of the mouth, for example - and from the great attention the infants
gave to the task. This training seems partly to have consisted in
Piaget imitating the child - "mutual imitation". The question of
"meaningfulness" arises here. Piapet concludes there is- no justification
for the idea that imitation begins with meaningful and.-significant
movements and is later transferred to meaningless movements; his
evidence is that the movements his infants imitated first were meaning¬
less, e.g. putting a finger in the mouth, and only later did they
imitate meaningful movements of the same organs, e.g. putting a spoon
to the mouth. The reason for the order of attainment is found in the
mechanism of the spontaneous schemas. Imitation begins with movements
that are ends in themselves, and is only later applied to movements
integrated in those schemas, and so the pace of imitation is bound up
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in the schemas, and differentiates along with them.
Since accommodation to a new model requires a flexibility of
schemas dependent on their co-ordination, and as mentioned above the
fourth stage of sensori-motor development sees the elaboration of
co-ordinations between schemas, it is not surprising that it is
during this stage that infants become capable of imitating new
movements. Accommodation is beginning to be differentiated from
assimilation. Piaget found that at eight months of age his children
were able to imitate new sounds, a "marionette" movement of the wrist,
hitting a duck with a comb, etc. However, they were unable to
imitate entirely new movements made without being seen. At this
stage they are capable only of the application of known means to new
situations, and of further investigation.
Stage Y Systematic imitation of new models including those
involving movements invisible to the child (12-18 months)
During this stage of sensori-motor development the child moves
from mere investigation of objects to active experimentation. His
imitation then becomes exact. Because accommodation and assimilation
are now differentiated the child can go beyond the accommodation of
existing schemas to accommodation through systematic trial and error.
Thus, after the age of 12 months Piaget observed imitation of drawing,
putting on a bracelet, imitation of adult words through gradually
closer approximations,^putting a hand to the hair, touching the chin
(by gradually working the hand down from the mouth). The elements of
the schemas are now differentiated, and so the child can systematically
work through these and make invisible movements.
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Stage YI. Beginnings of representative imitation and the further
development of imitation (18 - 24- months)
The culmination of the development of imitation is this "final
stage, where the accommodation is interiorised and the child need no
longer experiment; he can imitate a new act immediately, Imitation
is no longer dependent on the actual model, but may be "deferred",
i.e. it takes place in the absence of the model, presumably in
response to some sort of representation of the model, or it may
occur to an actual representation, an image. Representation is also
apparent in children's imitation of material objects. Thus Piaget
noted during this stage immediate imitation of a very complex arm
movement; deferred imitation, in one instance of behaviour seen in
another child twelve hours previously and in the other of an illustration
of a child with his mouth open; and imitating with the mouth a material
object, a matchbox.
Problems of interpretation of Piaget's theory
Monumental though the task, and meticulous the observation, Piaget's
theory of imitation seems to concentrate more on the drawing of parallels
between the development of different aspects of intelligence, and the
description of the means by 'which representation as a mental memory
image might come about, than on the phenomenon itself. The result is
that certain difficulties of interpretation arise. The first problem
is the issue of training in imitation. V/hile on the one hand Piaget
believes that early imitation can be elicited by "the pedagogical
mania of nurses", on the other hand, for later imitation of movements
the child cannot see himself make, training, which partly consists in
"mutual imitation", is necessary. But the former case Piaget labels
"pseudo-imitation", maintaining that only under the. influence of
continual stimulation can it persist, as, e.g. smiling does. Piaget
claims this to be an instance of "non-intentional convergence
between the action of the model and that of the subject" (Piaget
1945/62). The later imitation through training he considers true
imitation, because the model is assimilated via intelligent indices
to the child's own activity. Now, if the only difference between
pseudo-imitation and true imitation is that the former does not persist,
while the latter does, he has himself provided an instance where this
is not the case. It was the errors in production which led him to
believe that the later imitation was true imitation, and yet if the
former is not true imitation, then error should also be apparent there.
If the infant is unaware of the convergence between his action and
that of the model, why should he be able to repeat that action, and
not produce a different one.
Another problem arises with Piaget's conception of familiarity.
Infants are not able on his theory to imitate actions for which they
do not already have schemas. Obviously then in any instance of
non-imitation it could be argued that that particular infant had not
spontaneously practised the required schema. The difficulty any
investigator might have in determining the familiarity of a particular
act for a particular child would be extreme. It is to the point that
Piaget himself classified similar actions in one of his daughters,
m one instance as imitation of a simple secondary circular reaction
and later as imitation of a new model. Thus hitting a soap dish
with a brush (Piaget, 1945/62 obs. 15) it occurs in Stage III of
imitative development while hitting a duck with a comb (Piaget,
1945/62 obs. 36) occurs in Stage IV of imitative development.
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Parton (1976) considers there to be a difficulty with Piaget's
belief that the infant must associate the visual perception of other's
mouths and the tactilo-kinesthetic perception of his own mouth before
he can imitate. The infant must make the response before the
association can be formed; if factors other than kinesthetic feed¬
back account for this first response, then they might also account
for what seems to be subsequent imitation.
Although there are problems of interpretation with Piaget's Theory
of the development of representation through imitation, subsequent
research has substantiated his description of the development of imitative
ability itself. Thus Paraskevopolous and Hunt (1971) and Uzgiris 1972
reported broad similarities between Piaget's description of this
development and their own findings from longitudinal and cross-sectional
studies. However, in neither of these studies were infants younger than
one month used as subjects.
Piaget's description of the development of imitation is the only
longitudinal study available; although issue may be taken on
particular points, the development of the imitation of particular acts
he describes has been substantiated by other research. (Paraskevopolous




Piaget's theory of the development of representation through
imitation is the only major theory of this development with strong
evidence to support it, at least after the age of four months
(Paraskevopolous and Hunt, 1971; Uzgiris 1972). The theory allows for
direct experimentation, and clear predictions can be made.
(1) Very young infants, (0 - 3months of age), incapable of
representation or thought, in whom co-ordination of the senses has not
developed, will be incapable of imitation of bodily movements even when
these are already in their repertoire of bodily movement.
(2) Older infants )6 - 10 months of age) who can only represent
objects or movements by performing the familiar actions appropriate
to them, will be incapable of imitation of novel movements, even when
these movements naturally occur as part of other schemas.
(3) Children (18 - 24 months of age) who are capable of imitating
novel acts immediately and are therefore capable of forming and acting
on the basis of images will be able to act upon information supplied
by representations, whether pictorial or literal.
It was to a test of these three predictions that the experiments
I shall describe first were applied. Experiments I - IV were designed
to test the first prediction, that young infants cannot imitate actions
already in their motor repertoires. Experiment V was designed to test
the second prediction, that older infants cannot imitate novel movements.
Experiments VI and VIII were designed to test the third prediction,
that children should be able to act on the basis of pictorial or literal
rep re sentations.
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Bruner's theory would not allow for imitation in very young or
even slightly older infants, since he agrees with Piaget that
representation through action is all that is available to the infant
in the first year of life. Bruner would agree with Piaget that by the
age of 18 - 21+ months the child is capable of "knowing something
though a picture of it" - iconic representation (Bruner 1966).
Bower's theory would not allow for accurate imitation in young
infants; since he argues that higher levels of abstraction precede
and indeed generate the lower levels (Bower 1978), it is difficult to
see how young infants would be able to produce specific and precise
imitation of a model. However, his theory would allow for
representation to have become specific enough to allow for action on
the basis of a pictorial or literal representation.
Experiments I - IV
These experiments were designed to investigate the possibility of
early infant imitation. Modern techniques of videotaping allow for
precise recording of model and subject movements, and the assessment of
any relationship between these. The comparison of several infants of
differing ages under the same experimental circumstances permits study of
any development in ability.
Piaget's contention that young infants are incapable of imitation is
in any case not in accord with some other reports, although these were
mostly early, and anecdotal in nature. However, Piaget himself noted
that there were puzzling instances of imitation for which he did not offer
an explanation (1945/62). More recent research, unfortunately of only a
single infant, (Gardner and Gardner, 1970) does indicate that imitation
is present to a limited extent in six week old infants. I consider the
findings on imitation reported for particular acts below.
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Mouth behaviours
Piaget found that tongue protrusion and mouth opening could not he
imitated until the age of 8 - 12 months. However, Valentine believed
he saw imitation of mouth opening at 2 weeks of age (1930)« Zazzo found
evidence of tongue protrusion at 28 days (1959) and Guillaume (1926/71)
quotes Scupin (1907) as finding tongue protrusion at 11 weeks. G-uillaume
dismisses this as a form of selection of behaviours of the sort often used
by animal trainers, by which I believe he meant operant conditioning.
The similarity between stimulus and response was merely fortuitous.
Gardner and Gardner (1970) noted mouth opening and tongue protrusion in
imitation in an infant aged six weeks.
Uzgiris (1972) has reported some imitation of mouth movement in
10 week old infants to a "cooing" model.
Head Behaviours
Piaget found imitation of head nodding and shaking at seven weeks
of age. His explanation of this seeming imitation was that the
infant in attempting to follow the movements of the model was forced
to make slight head movements herself, and thus in order to make the
interesting event (the model's head moving) re-occur, need only
reproduce her own movements. In the first place, one wonders how
far Piaget's head was moving, since eye movements alone would have
been sufficient for the infant to follow a slight movement at that age,
and he did not observe head movements prior to all instances of
imitation. In the second place, the infant would not have been able
to re-create the interesting event, since the whole stimulus array
would move, not just Piaget's head. In the third place, why should
the child have been so particular about which interesting event she
wanted repeated, and move her head appropriately (i.e. up and down or
side to side) as the model did? Piaget found the same response to
toys; he concluded that visually perceived movement was being
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"imitated" and not head movements per se.
Valentine (1930) found that this movement could not be imitated
until 12 months of age.
Hand Behaviours
Piaget observed moving of the fingers in imitation at 6 months
(Piaget 1945, 19&2 obs. 13). However, Bower (1971 pers. comm.)
indicated that a student of his, K. Lloore, had found evidence of imitation
of hand movements in neonates. Gardner and Gardner (1970) found some
evidence of hand opening and closing at six weeks of age.
Design of experiments on imitation in young infants.
The design of experiments to study imitation posed problems. If
an infant once imitated a model it might simply be the case that he
was responding in a particular way to that stimulus, either because
that stimulus was some sort of innate releaser of that response, or
because he had himself recently made a similar movement. If the
infant continued to imitate the model, it might be true that this
behaviour -was being shaped by the reinforcement of seeing the original
stimulus repeated. If the infant did not continue to imitate he
might be showing pseudo - and not true imitation.
It was decided then in view of these problems that the frequency
of infant's imitative behaviour in the presence of one model v/ould be
compared with the frequency of the same behaviour in the presence of
a different model. If one type of movement occurred more often
when that same movement was being modelled than when another
movement was being modelled, then imitation might fairly be said to
have taken place. It would be unlikely that innate releasing mechanisms
could be at work in the imitation of a number of movements without this
having become obvious to the many investigators in this field.
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Secondly, there should be'a short period before the model began
to act during which the infant should not be seen to make any cf the
movements the model is about to demonstrate. This period can not be
considered a baseline for subsequent behaviour for the following
reasons.
The motor capacities of young infants are extremely limited.
Any movement to be imitated must of necessity be possible for them to
make, and it is therefore likely to occur spontaneously during the
experiment. An adequate baseline measure is thuswellnigh impossible.
If, for example, human mouth movements are to be modelled no useful
purpose can be served by presenting an infant with his mother when he
has been staring at a blank wall. The arousal effect of such a
stimulus might well be sufficient to produce similar mouth movements.
Nor, on the other hand, would I consider the presentation of a still,
unsmiling mother an adequate baseline measure; tongue protrusion, for
example, has been used as an index of infant distress (Aronson and
Rosenbloom 1973) and such an extraordinary sight might well prove
distressing. Stern (1974) and Trevarthen (1975) have both noted
infant distress when an unmoving mother's face was presented. A
stranger's face during a baseline period might predispose an infant
to make a particular response; a mother's smiling and talking-face
presentation during baseline might cause the infant to become
fractious when at my request she began to make some other movement.
The use of a period before modelling begins during which the to-be-modelled
behaviour is not observed does reduce the possibility of the model
inadvertently repeating the child's own act and thus obtaining a
seeming imitation, but it cannot be considered a baseline.
Thirdly, to avoid the possibility of the model shaping the infant's
29.
response, the mother was chosen as the model in the experiments
involving human imitation. If the mother was unaware of the purpose
of the experiment she was unlikely to be able to influence the infant's
behaviour significantly. In any case, a stranger is not so often
imitated as is a familiar person, (Valentine 1930) even from the
youngest months, according to Piaget (1945/1962).
Fourthly, to avoid pseudo-imitation, the imitation must be repeated
on another occasion of testing.
Fifthly, the infants' behaviour must be assessed by an observer
unaware of the action being modelled to the child. Piaget's objective
appraisal of infant imitative ability may not have been emulated in
older studies, leading their authors to perceive imitation where there
was rone. he know that adults are likely to ascribe intention to the
most insignificant of infant behaviours (MacFarlane 1977, Nev/son 1977) ;
knowledge of the action being modelled would undoubtedly influence
the collation of results.
Sixthly, As far as possible, I tried to avoid contamination of
results by the errors Piaget describes (1945/62 obs. 28 -.31) as taking
place when the infant assimilates the model to an analagous schema
instead of to the correct one; e.g. when Piaget opened and closed his
eyes, the infants opened and closed their mouths or hands. I did
not present similar movements of different organs as models in the same
experiments. If the model were to open and close the mouth, the
infant might make the error of opening and closing the eyes; if the
model changed to opening and closing the eyes there might be an increase
in the frequency of the infant's opening and closing of the eyes,





































presentation of the model. This result would read to a false
judgement of ability to imitate the model cf opening and closing
the eyes. Alternatively, the infant might actually imitate.- opening
and closing the eyes, but at the same frequency as when mouth opening
was presented, where there the opening and closing of the eyes was
not imitation. This would lead to a false judgement of inability
to imitate the model.
Behaviours to be studied
I considered that mouth opening, tongue protrusion, head nodding,
head shaking, toy movement and finger movement were obvious models
with which to present young infants, given the contradictory evidence
as to the possibility of these models being imitated.
In addition, I decided to present arm movement and eye movement
models. Piaget (1945/62) found that arm movements could not be
imitated until around 10 months of age; but Bower et al. (1970a)
found that neonates could make directed arm movements to an object.
There seems no reason then why they should not be able to touch their
own faces in imitation. Piaget (1945/62) found that mouth and eye
movements are imitated successfully in the same period of imitative
development, at 10 - 11 months of age. I have referred above to
evidence that very young infants can imitate mouth movements; I
decided therefore to present an eye closing model on the assumption
that imitation of this model should be no more difficult than of mouth
movement.
The general design of the young infant imitation experiments is
shown in Figure 1. Some modification was necessary in Experiment I,
where three models were presented, and in Experiment IV, where the
observation period was altered. These changes in design will be
discussed in the descriptions of those experiments.
XI
The models used in Experiments I - IV are laid out below.
Experiment I Shaking the head; toy movement; tongue protrusion.
Experiment II Nodding the head; tongue protrusion.
Experiment III Opening and closing the mouth; finger movement.




Head turning in imitation of mother arid of toy; tongue protrusion in
imitation of mother.
The purpose of this experiment was to attempt to replicate Piaget's
finding (1945/1962 obs. 5 and 6), that infants of about 7-12 weeks
would turn their heads after seeing their father do so, or after
seeing a toy move, and to confirm reports of tongue protrusion in
imitation at ages younger than twelve weeks (Guillaume, 1926: Zazzo
1959' Gardner and Gardner, 1970).
METHOD
Subjects - 4 boys and 4 girls, aged 4-13 weeks, of whom seven
completed both parts of the experiment (mean age on first visit
66.4 days, s.d. 26.1 days). All were full-term, normal, healthy,
infants. Two other female infants could not be used because of
continuous crying.
Apparatus - The toy used was a green and red bird, approx. 4" x 3'1 x 3"»
which had been found to be an attractive object to infants in
this age range.
Modelled behaviours.
1. The moving toy. Out of sight behind the infant's head, I moved
the toy from approximately 40 cm. directly above the infant's head
slov/ly to his right (or left) back to centre, and then to the left (or
right) and back to centre when the infant was fixating the toy, for
five minutes.
2. Shaking the head. The mother, when the infant was looking at her,
moved her head slowly to one side, then the other, to the first side
again, and again to the other, the whole movement taking about 5 seconds.
She was then to look at the infant. Mothers spontaneously varied the
side to which they turned first. After a short interval, if the
infant were still watching her, she was to repeat the movement'. This
condition also lasted for five minutes.
3. Protruding the tongue. The mother, when the infant was watching
her, was to protrude her tongue slowly and then retract it, and repeat
this after a short interval. This movement was about three seconds
in total duration, and the condition was five minutes long.
Procedure
the infants lay on a bed above which was mounted a Shibaden HV 16s
camera recording the full face image cf the infant's head on to a Sony
CV2100 ACE VTR. infants were supported by firm pillows to allow free
head movement. When present, the mother was seated beside the infant
with her face approximately 45 cm. from his. Her behaviour was recorded
by another video camera behind the infant. Mixed through an Effects
Generator these camera inputs produced a split-screen image with the
mother on one side and the infant on the other.
Instructions to mother/observation period
while explaining the experiment to the mother, who was either sitting
beside the child or looking at the monitor, I watched the monitor to
check that the child did not protrude his tongue or shake his head
before the experiment began for a period of at least one minute.
Mothers were informed that I was interested in "baby's reactions to
moving faces and objects".
The three conditions were repeated on two occasions, separated by
approximately one week. The third condition was always the last, but
the first two were counterbalanced for order with half the infants
starting -with condition I and the other half with condition 2 (reversed
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for each infant on the subsequent occasion). The total experimental
period was thus thirty two minutes.
Should any mother during this experiment (or any of the following
ones) express the opinion that her infant was imitating her, I said
this was probably coincidental. Mothers were asked not to practise
their infants by repeating any of the movements in the week between
tests; and by and large they seemed not to have done so. At the end
of the second trial I explained the true nature of the experiment, and
this usually came as a complete surprise to the mothers, most of whom,
following the advice given them by doctors, health visitors etc.,




An observer scored the tapes blindly, first for head shaking and
then for tongue protrusion. In this and in all the subsequent infant
imitation studies the observer was unaware of the true purpose of the
study; he did not know how many models were being presented, nor what
they were. Occasionally, I asked him if he could guess which model
was being presented and he was nearly always wrong (he was not informed
of this fact). He could see only the infant's image, the mother's
image being blacked off on the monitor he watched. I watched another
monitor and recorded the time of occurrence of the movements.
* Since the VTR would not be stopped without loss of precision in the
timing, each experimental session for each infant had to be viewed many
times over. The observer did not score for the two movements simul¬
taneously; often he would express the desire to see particular segments
again, to check on his judgement. As there was therefore at least
8 hours of tape to be scored in this experiment alone it will be
appreciated that analysis took months.
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Head. snaKing was categorised in the following way. If the infant's
head turned to the side through approximately 10°, so that the edge
of his eye lined up with the pillow, and then turned hack to the
midline, half a turn was counted. A full turn was the edge of one
eye lined up with the pillow ana tnen the edge af the other eye lined
up with the other side of the pillow and then a turn hack to the
midline.
The criteria for tongue protrusion were more stringent. The
infant's tongue must be seen to pass over the lower lip and actually
protrude from the mouth. Pushing the tongue behind or on top of the
lip was not counted, nor were movements of the tongue inside the mouth.
Tongue protrusions when the hand or finger was touching the mouth were
also not counted.
Results of data collection
•Analysis of a random sample of tapes of eight trials showed that in
these the mean number of times the models were presented was as follows;
Model 1 (Toy) 11.5 (s.d. 2.65)
Model 2 (Head shaking) 10.25 (s.d. 2.87) and
Model 3 (Tongue protrusion) 28.5 (s.d. 10.72)
Obviously the number of times a model was presented depended on the amount
of times the infant watched the model and on individual variation between
modeIs.
The number of head turns made by the infants to the shaking human
head, movement of the toy and tongue protrusion models are shown in Table 1.
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TABLE 1
Number of infant head turns in the three conditions.







days Head turn Toy Protrusion Head turn Toy Protrusion
1 4.6 0 1 12 - - -
2 5.3 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 6.1 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 8.1 0 0 0 0 0 0
5 12.5
1
2 0 0 0 0 0
6 12.5 0 0 0 0 0 Ox





2 0 i 0





Mean 0.5 0.12 0.25 0.07 0.07 0.07
s.d. 1.1 0.55 0.38 0.18 0.18 0.18
* severe crying
Results for both trials summed.
Model
Head turn Toy Tongue protrusion
Total 4.5 1.5 2.5
Mean 0.31 0.1 0.17
s.d. 0.75 0.28 0.31
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fc-tests for differences between correlated pairs of means was
carried out on the total number of head turns in both sessions. The
number of head turns infants made when the mother was shaking her head
was not significantly different from when the toy was being moved
(7 df. t = 0.93, n.s.) nor from when she was protruding her tongue
(df. = 7, t = 1.31, n.s.). The null hypothesis, that there would be
no difference in amount of head shaking by the infants in the three
conditions, must therefore be upheld.
As is clear from the Table, there were very few movements of the
head, either to the mother's model or the toy; on the one occasion
when a child seemed to be imitating (infant no. 7, first visit), the
video record showed that the child was extremely inattentive, kicking
her legs, looking around, etc., during the modelling period. One
infant, (no. 8) began to cry 20 seconds after his mother began to shake
her head on the first session, and continued to do so throughout the
condition, sticking his tongue out as he did so. Another infant (no. 6)
cried in earnest half way through her second session (3rd condition).
In general it may be remarked that the infants became extremely
bored with both the mother shaking her head and with the movement of
the toy. Although at first infants would follow these movements with
both eyes and slight head movements, by the end of these conditions some
of the infants were hardly attending at all.
Tongue protrusion.
Table 2 shows the frequency of tongue protrusion during the three
conditions. No order effects were evident in the efficacy of the
first and second models shown to each infant in eliciting tongue
protrusion. 55% of total response occurred in the first model presented.
It may be recalled that infant No. 6 (2nd session 3rd condition) and
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infant no. 8 (1st session 1st condition) were both crying quite severely
throughout; although it was the case that all infant no. 6's tongue
protrusions took place before she began to cry and that infant no. 8's
mostly took place while his eyes were shut for extended periods.
TABLE 2
Number of infant tongue protrusions in the three conditions.
1










1. 4.6 0 0 0 - - -
2. 5.3 1 1 8 0 0 1
3. 6.1 0 2 2 4 0 8
4. 8.1 8 3 2 2 0 9
5. 12.5 2 0 25 3 1 7
6. 12.5 2 0 8 2 c; 5*
7. 12.6 0 0 0 0 4 11
8. 13.1 12* 3 7 3 3 2
Total 27 9 52 13 43
Mean 3.125 1.13 6.5 2 1.86 6.14
s. d. 4.45 1.34 8.1 1.52 2.1 3.67
3c crying severely
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Results for both trials summed
Model
Tongue
Head turn TO£ Protrusion
Total 41 22 95
Mean 2.6 I.47 6.33
s.d. 3.36 1.73 6.29
fc-tests for differences between correlated pairs of means were
carried out on the total number cf tongue protrusions in both sessions.
The number of tongue progrusions infants made when the mother was
performing the same movement compared to the number each infant made
when she was shaking her head was not significantly different (df. = 7,
t = 2.20, n.s.) but was significantly different from when the toy
was being moved (df. = 7, t = 2.94, p <■ .05). Comparing number of
tongue protrusions on the first trial, the difference between the
number of tongue protrusions when that was being modelled and head turning
was being modelled was not significant (df. = 7, t = 0.5, n.s.) nor when
the toy was being moved (df. =7, t =1.73 n.s.). However, both these
differences were significant in the second trial; for frequency compared
between head turning and tongue protrusion models (df. = 6, t = 2.87
P < .05) and for toy and tongue protrusion models (df = 6, t = 2.72,
» No significant correlation between age and imitative ability was
P < .03).
found (Spearman correlation coefficient r= 0o13).
In general most of the infants were attentive and happy during this
condition, but by the end of it some were becoming restless.
Figure 2 shows the results of this experiment graphically.
DISCUSSION
This experiment failed to replicable Piaget's finding of head shaking
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FIGURE 2: RESULTS OF EXPERIMENT I
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heads on occasion, and so were not incapable of doing so. It did
_ replicate the reported findings by Guillaume, Zazzo and Gardner and
Gardner on imitation of tongue protrusion to a limited extent;' although
the youngest infant zo show this was over five weeks of age.
However, the procedure was too long, as shown by the number of
infants who became distressed at some point; and it was therefore
decided that since as time went by the infants were likely to be dis¬
tressed and so to protrude the tongue, this part of Experiment I should
be repeated. Experiment II attempted to replicate these results, and
if possible, to find evidence that they did not merely "pseudo-
imitation", as might be possible, since a significant difference between





Nodding the head in imitation of the mother and protruding the tongue
in imitation of the mother.
The purpose of this experiment was to replicate Piaget's finding
(1945/1962, obs. 5) that a 10 week old infant would imitate a nodding




Six infants, 3 boys and 3 girls, of ,ages ranging from 3 - H weeks
(mean age 52 days; s.d. 19«4) served as subjects. All were full-term,
normal, healthy infants.
Modelled behaviours
The tongue protrusion model was as described in Experiment I, with
the mother as model. The nodding model, again the mother, slowly nodded
her head up and down two or three times, and then stopped, in a manner
similar to that described by Piaget. After a while, if the infant was
still watching her, the model repeated this action, which took about
3 seconds.
Procedure
The procedure, instructions to mother and observation period were
the same as in Experiment I. Each condition lasted for five minutes,
and the first was followed immediately by the second condition. The
experiment was repeated approximately 1 week later for all subjects,
with order of presentation of conditions counterbalanced across subjects




An observer scored the tapes blindly for both head nodding and
tongueprotrusion movements by the infant, separately. Any movement
of the head in a downwards (or upwards) direction followed by an upwards
(or downwards) movement was to be considered as a head nod. The
criteria for tongue protrusion were as previously used in Experiment I.
Results of data collection
Head Nodding
The observer failed to report any head nods at all, although very
infrequently movements either up or down were observed and so presumably
the infants were capable of making this movement. This result was in
accord with my own observations. This does not seem to be a typical
behaviour for infants in Scotland, at least.
Tongue protrusion
Analysis of a random sample of tapes of eight trials showed that
in these the mean number of times the nodding model was presented was
26.5 (s.d. 7.85) and the mean number of times the tongue protrusion
model was presented was 34«5 (s.d. 6.76).
Table 3 shows the number of tongue protrusions by the infants which
occurred in the two conditions.
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TABLE 3
Number of infant tongue protrusions in the two conditions.
Subjects by age in 1st trial 2nd trial
weeks and days Model Model
Nodding Tongue Protrusion Nodding Tongue Protrusion
1.. 3.2 7 19 4 18
2. 6.4 12 11 4 22
3. 6.4 3 13 2 7
4. 7.5 8 10 9 12
5. 9.6 2 5 4 8
6. 11.1 3 9 4 11
Total 35 67 27 78
Mean 5.83 11.17 4.5 13
d. d. 3.87 4.67 2.35 5.87




s. d. 3.13 5.14
The imitative performance of the younger infants (as assessed by the
difference between the total number of tongue protrusions in the two
conditions) was superior to that of the older infants (Spearman










t-tests for correlated pairs of means were carried out. '.Then
applied to the total number of tongue protrusions in the nodding and
the tongue protrusion model conditions for each infant, the difference
between these conditions was significant (df = 5> t = 9 p .01).
The difference between the number of tongue protrusions in the two
conditions was significant both on the first trial (df = 5, t = 2.63,
P < .05) and on the second (df = 5> t = 3.^3S p < .05). The results
of the analysis are shown graphically in figure 3. No order effects
were discernible; the frequency cf total tongue protrusion to that
model was 57.2% when it was presented as the first model.
In general the infants attended to the mother without fussing, and
some infants watched the mother intently throughout. Uany of them
smiled when the mother made a movement. By the end of the experiment
however some of the infants would not look at the mother.
DISCUSSION
The results of the experiment do not unfortunately replicate
Piaget's finding with respect to head nodding. One reason why this
may be so is the fact that the infants in this study were semi-reclining,
while J. was upright in her mother's arms while Piaget modelled this
movement (1945/olj obs. 5). However, I felt that the poor head
control typical of infants up to three months of age might militate
against a positive result if the infants were seated in a chair or on
someone's knee. Lying down the infants' heads were supported, and could
be moved up and down. Piaget does not tell us how close he was to his
subject, but if that subject had to move her head up and down to follow
his movement, he must have been vepy close indeed, as none of the infants
in this study showed any such following movements with she head.
FIGURE h: IMITATION OF TONGUE PROTRUSION
IN AN INFANT AGED 23 DAYS
kd.
The tongue protrusion model was imitated and all five of the
infants whose behaviour showed this clearly on the first trial imitated
again on the second trial, ruling out the possibility of "pseddo-imitation"
(unless the mothers had ignored my request not to practise the child -
rather an unlikely possibility given the fact that most of them showed
obvious surprise when later told the true purpose cf the study). An
example of tongue protrusion is shown in Figure 4. The results of the
statistical analysis clearly demonstrate that imitation of this movement
is possible. Actually watching the videotape conveyed a strong feeling
to an observer that the infants were imitating; particularly on those
occasions when an infant seemed to be trying to protrude his tongue,
watching his mother intently all the time, and only succeeding in
pushing out his lower lip -with the tongue (which of course could not be




Opening and closing the mouth and moving; the fingers
The purpose of this experiment was to attempt to replicate
Gardner and Gardner's (1970) observation of opening the mouth in
imitation a six week old infant, and Moore's finding of finger movement
imitation in neonates (Bower, 1971, pers. comm.). Piaget (1945/62 did




Eight infants, four boys and four girls,served as subjects. Their
ages ranged from 3-13 weeks (mean age 56.63 days, s.d. 24.51 days).
All were full-term, normal, healthy infants.
Modelled behaviours
The model of opening and closing the mouth consisted in the model
opening wide and then closing her mouth, and then after an interval
repeating the movement if the infant were still watching her. This
movement took about 3 seconds. The hand movement consisted in
moving the fingers slowly, as if playing a scale, with the right hand.
The movement was repeated after a pause if the infant was watching.
The hand was lifted to approximately shoulder level in order to be
clearly visible to the infant.
Procedure
The procedure adopted in Experiments I and II was altered for this
study. A split-screen two camera image would not give a sufficiently
large view of the infant for accurate analysis of hand and face movements.
Therefore, the infants in this and the subsequent experiments on imitation
sat in a standard baby seat angled slightly backwards, well propped with
47.
pillows to prevent them from falling to one side. '.The mother with,
their faces about 40 cm. apart sat directly in front of the infant.
Behind the infant to his right was a large 3" ky 2" mirror, so -that a
single HVlpS Video camera could record the infant's whole body and a
smaller mirror image of the mother. The mother's nead was higher
than the infant's, but all mothers inclined their faces to the infant
so that they were in the en face position. .Apart from this Procedure,
Instructions to mother and Observation period were as in the previous
experiments. Length of time of any condition was however shortened
from 5 minutes to 4 minutes, as in Experiment II it had seemed that
some of the infants were becoming bored by the end of experiment.
RESULTS
Scoring of data
As before, an observer scored the tapes blind, the portion of the
monitor screen with the mother's image being covered over. The hand
movement was scored by measuring all the time periods in seconds in
7/hich the.infant's fingers of either or both hands were seen to move.
Finger movements when the infants were touching their clothes (and it
is very common for infants of this age range to finger their clothes)
or were touching the other hand were not counted. Each ..-tape was scored
twicejonce for movement of one hand and then for movement of the other.
Mouth opening was scored when the infant obviously opened its
mouth. The mouth must close again before another mouth opening movement
could be scored. Only mouth opening movements from a position where
the mouth was shut or only just open could be scored, i.e. if the
infant's mouth was already open a further movement; was not scored.


















FIGURE 5: RESULTS OF EXPERIMENT Hi
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Tongue protrusions were also not counted as mouth opening.
Results of data analysis
Analysis of a random sample of tapes of eight trials showed
that in these the mean number of times the mouth model was presented
was 44.5 (s.d. 17.68); the finger movement model was almost continuous
through the trials. The results of this ejqseriment are shown graphically
in Figure 5.
The amount of time infants moved their fingers in both conditions
is shown in Table 4. Two infants cried continuously throughout the
second trial and their movements could not be scored.
TABLE 4
Time spent (in seconds) by infants moving their fingers in the two conditions
Subjects by age in 1st trial 2nd trial
weeks and days Model Model
Finger moving Mouth opening Finger moving Mouth opening
1.. 3.1 128 142 61 8
2. 4.1 5 8 86 37
3. 6.0 60 10 - -
4. 7.0 0 3 - -
5. 8.1 33 23 3 7
6. 10 26 6 26 96
7. 11.4 12 0 30
8. 13.5 23 10 6 6
Total 287 202 212 168
Mean 35.87 25.25 35.33 28
s.d. 41.66 47.66 32.4 35.28
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Results of both trials summed.
Model








t-tests for correlated pairs of means were carried out. There
was no significant difference between the amount of time the infants
moved their fingers when the model was doing so and when she was opening
her mouth (df = 7, t = 1.44, n.s.). The null hypothesis was therefore
retained.












Finger moving Mouth ooening Finger moving LIouth ooening
1. 3.1 5 11 5 5
2. 4.1 3 8 6 3
3. 6.0 7 17 0 -
4. 7.0 5 12 - -
5. 8.1 8 12 2 4
6. 10.1 0 0 1 8
7. 11.4 0 4 4 6
8. 13.5 2 5 4 7
Total 34 69 22 33
Mean 4.25 8.63 3.66 5.5
s.d. 3.54 5.45 1.86 1.87
Results of both trials slimmed.
Model




fc-tests for correlated pairs of means were carried out. Infants
did over the results of both trials open their mouths significantly
more often when the same movement was being modelled than when the
finger moving model was presented (df = 7t = 6.12 p < .01). However,
this significance derived from the results at the first trial, since
the difference in that trial was significant (df = 7» t = 4.05,
p <1 0.01) while in the second trial there was no significant difference
between the frequency of mouth movements in the two conditions
(df = 5, t = 1.63, n.s. ).
Order of presentation of the mouth opening model seemed ineffective
60.7% of all imitative responses occurred during presentations where
it was the first model shown. Age was not correlated with imitative
performance, (r = -0.24).
Apart from the obvious exceptions (infants 3 and 4) the infants
seemed relatively happy during the experiment. However, many of them
protruded their tongues frequently, making analysis difficult. The
mean frequency of tongue protrusion in the finger moving condition was
11.5 (s.d. 12.4) and in the mouth opening condition was 11 (s.d. 12.77).
Most of these tongue protrusions were observed in the two youngest and
in the oldest subjects.
DISCUSSION
Because it was the subjective inpression that at least one infant
(infant no. 3) was imitating the hand movement, the lack of statistical
significance in the results was disappointing. Infants were not
observed to look at their own hands, although they did watch the model's
hand. The four oldest infants in trial 2 of this experiment spent
most of their time either chewing their hands or fingering one hand with
the other. This precluded the inclusion in the analysis of many of
the finger movements they made. None of the infants were seen to raise
FIGURE 6: IMITATION OF MOUTH OPENING
IN AN INFANT AGED 22 DAYS
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their hands to the same position as the model; the hands were kept
close to the body.
That the infants did imitate mouth opening movements in Trial 1
is clear. An example is shown in figure 6, why infants did not
imitate in Trial 2 may be explicable in view of the observation above
that oo.ojb of the infants who completed this part of the study had
their hands in their mouths much of the time. It may have been the
case that these infants were shoiving subtle signs of distress or these
may have been attempts at imitation that failed comparable to the
confusions between bodily parts Piaget noted (1945/62 obs. 25, 28, 25,
30 and 31J. The confusions of movement Piaget desc/VoeJl did, however,
retain some general connection with the model's movements (i.e. opening
or shutting the wrong part of the body) except for Obs. 28, where an
infant raised a finger when tongue protrusion was modelled. Because
neither the frequency of tongue protrusion nor the amount of hand chewing
seemed to vary with the model the former hypothesis may be more likely
to be true; but there is no means of ascertaining this. The mean
frequency of tongue protrusion during both models was nearly as high
as that obtained when a tongue protrusion model was presented in
Experiment III. It is not obvious in any case why mouth opening and
finger moving models should have had any distressing effect. Imitation





Opening and shutting the eyes and putting the hand to the mouth
The purpose of this experiment was to attempt to replicate Piaget's
findings on imitation of these movements with younger infants (1945/62).
Both these movements he found were imitated at about the same age as
was tongue protrusion; since I have shown some evidence that this may
be able to be imitated at ages younger than those of his subjects, it
might be the case that this is also true for opening and shutting the
eyes and for arm gestures. The arm gesture Piaget used was to put the
finger in the mouth; but in case this lead to chewing the hands as
described in Experiment III, I decided to use a different gesture,




Six infants, three boys and three girls, served as subjects;
their ages ranged from 3-15 weeks on the date of the first trial
(mean age 60.83 days, s.d. 27.5 days). All were full-term, normal,
healthy infants. Two infants required two visits before the first
trial could be carried out. Two other infants cried so much during
the second modelling condition on the second trial that movement data
-was unobtainable.
Modelled behaviours
Opening and shutting the eyes was modelled by the mothers.
Mothers varied in how long they kept their eyes shut; but this normally
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took about two seconds, and mothers were asked to repeat the movement
when the infant was attending.
The arm gesture used was to move the arm until the palm of the
hand covered the mouth. This took about three seconds, and was
repeated as above.
Procedure
The infants sat in an infant chair as in Experiment III, and the
instructions to the mother were as in Experiments I and II. Infants
were exposed to the different conditions in a counterbalanced order
which was reversed on the second trial approximately one week later.
The observation period was however altered. The infant was observed
for one minute before testing began and note taken of the times of any
hand to mouth gestures or blinking. It would obviously have been
impossible to wait until the infants had not shut their eyes for a
minute before beginning the trials.
RESULTS
Scoring of data
As before, an observer scored the tapes unaware of the action the
mother was making. The criterion for opening and shutting the eyes
was simplej the infant had merely to blink.
For the arm gesture, it was decided that only a movement of the
hand from a distance of at least one hand's breadth from the face to
touch the lower portion of the face would be acceptable as imitation,
and only then if the other hand were not already touching the face (in
case the intention was only to touch the other hand). For this
experiment electronic timing was possible in analysis by means of a















FIGURE 7: RESULTS OF EXPERIMENT IV
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Results of data collection •
Data was collected on all instances of the mother producing both
models; the mean number of times the hand model was presented-'on a
trial was 17.2 (.s.d. 6.1) and the mean number of times the eye model
was presented was 21.2 (s.d. 3,1). The mean length of time the
infants watched the mother during a four minute trial with the hand
model was 3 minutes 2 seconds; they watched the eye model for a mean
length of time of 2 minutes 40 seconds.
The mean time before the experiment began in which blinking was
seen was 19.33 seconds (s.d. 20.64) and in which a hand gesture was
seen was 55.83 seconds (s.d. 14.43). These times seem sufficiently
long to rule out the possibility of imitation by the mother beginning
a sequence of seeming imitation in the child (mutual imitation).
In only one case did an infant make a movement simultaneous with the
beginning of the modelling behaviour and since the movement concerned
was eye closing this was irrelevant.
figure 7 shows the results of the experiment graphically.
Table 6 shows the number of hand movements the infants made in
the two modelling conditions.
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TABLE 6
Number of infant hand movements in the two conditions
Subjects D.y age in 1st trial 2nd trial
weelcs and days Model Model
Hand movement Ej>-e closing Hand movement Eye closing
1. 3.4 2 3 - 0
2. 7.4 0 0 0 0
3. 7.5 2 - 2 2
4. 8.1 5 2 8 4
5. 3.5 0 0 1 1
6. 15.5 1 3 3 -
Total 10 8 1U 7
Mean 1.66 1.33 2.8 1.4
s. d. 1.86 1.51 3.11 1.67
Results of both trie Is summe d.
Model
Hand movement Eye closing
Total 24 15
Mean 2.18 1.36
s. d. 2.44 1.50
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A t-test Tor correlated pairs of means v.ras carried out on the
total sum of hand movements in the two conditions. This showed that
there was no significant difference in amount of arm movement "between
the tv/o conditions (df = 5> t = 1.28, n.s. ),
i'able 7 shows the number of times the infants closed their eyes
in the two conditions.
TABLE 7







Hand movement Eye closing Hand movement Eye closing
1. 2*4 6 17 - 5
2. 7.4 19 24 3 4
3. 7.5 8 6 11 7
4. 8.1 12 15 8 14
oo• 3 11 4 12
6. 15.5 9 lb- 7 -
Total 57 87 33 b2
Mean 9.5 14-. 5 6.6 8.4
s. d. 5.54 6.02 3.21 4.39
Results of both trials summed.
Model
Hand movement Bye closing
Total 90 129
Mean 8.18 11.72
















































A t -test for correlated means revealed that there was no significant
difference between the number of times the infants closed their eyes,
during the two conditions (df = 5, t = 1.75j n.a.). However,,
inspection of the table suggested that in the first trial this comparison
might be significantly different, and a further t-test showed that this
was the case (df = 5, t = 2.77» P < .05). There was no significant
difference in amount of eye closing in the second trial between the
two conditions (df = 4, t = 0.9, n.s.).
There seemed to be no function of order when imitative eye
movements by the infant were compared. When eye closing was the first
model, 41.7% of all such eye movements occurred. Age was not correlated
with imitative performance (r =0.39).
The electronic timing device made possible accurate measure cf the
times of all infants' and mothers' behaviours. It might be possible
to detect patterns of imitation if mother's and infant's behaviour were
plotted over time. Accordingly for the youngest infant's first trial
(where the greatest difference in frequency of eye closing occurred)
mother's and infant's behaviours were compared as snown in Figure 8.
From this figure, it is clear that (on three of the five occasions when
she did so), the infant was shutting her eyes shortly after the model
had made the arm movement. The times in the condition where the model
was closing her eyes would also seem to indicate that the infant was
synchronising her behaviour with that of the mother. Whereas the
sequence beginning at 1 minute 57 seconds might be considered true
imitation, that beginning at 2 minutes 28 seconds could be mutual
imitation, since 15 seconds had elapsed since the infant last saw the
mother's eyes close. Since this infant's pattern of behaviour was so
difficult to interpret another time measure was taJoen. If infants are
imitating eye closing then it might reasonably be expected that their
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first closure of the eyes would occur sooner when the mother vms making
that same movement than when she was making another movement. fable 8
shows the latency of the infant's first eye closure from the time the
model first made a movement.
TABLE 8
Latency (in seconds) of the first eye closure in the two conditions
Infants o.y age
days
in weeks and Trial 1
1.1ode 1
Hand movement Eye closing
Trial 2
Model
Hand movement Eye closing
1. 3.4 21 7 - 25
2. 7.4 32 1 2 23
3. 7.5 35 2 9 69
4. 8.1 4 2 50 47
5. 8.5 13 0 45 4
6. 15.5 35 7 11 -
Total 150 19 117 168
Mean 23.33 3.17 23.4 • 33.6
£>. d. 12.9 3.06 22.32 24.98
Total summed over trials.
Hand movement Bye closing
Total 257 187
Mean 23.36 17
s. d. 16.81 22. 51
A it-teat for correlated pairs of means revealed that there was
no significant difference overall between the times of first eye
closure in the two conditions (df = 5, t = 0.89, n.s.). How/ever, in
view of the evidence above that infants might have been imitating in
the first trial a t-test was carried out with the data on times from
that trial, and the difference between time cf first eye closure in
the two conditions was significantly different (df =5, t = if.02 p < .05,).
A t-test between the,times of first eye closure in the two conditions
on the second trial was not significant (df = 3 t = 0.44, n.s.J.
DISCUSSION
Uhile there is no statistical evidence for imitation of hand
movement in this study the impression nonetheless remained after
inspection of the videotapes that infant 4 was imitating hand movement
on the second trial. Infant 8 repeatedly brought both hands clasped
together to the mouth in trial 1, which of course could not be counted.
Infant 2 looked extremely puzzled throughout the first trial of this
model -and waved her arms around.
There is evidence from the first trial cf the eye closure model
that infants were imitating this movement, but the second trial results
were not significant, not unsurprisingly given the high level of distress
found in that part of the experiment. The results of the latency
analysis are interesting, lending support to the significance of the
finding of imitation in trial 1; but may be merely a consequence of
the lower frequency of eye closure in the hand movement condition than
in the eye closure conditions. It is, of course, always possible that
the infants closed their eyes more often when the mother was performing
this gesture than 'when she was moving her hand because the sight of the
mother closing her eyes was aversive.
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'.There seems to be some evidence, then, of eye closure imitation;




This experiment was designed to replicate Piaget's (1945/62)
observations that older infants (6 - 10 months) are incapable of
systematic imitation of novel movements, even when these movements
occur as part of other schemas and so are familiar, or are visible
to the child. Thus, not until the age of llg- months was J. able to
immediately reproduce her mother's action of striking a duck with a
comb, and Piaget's action of striking a xylophone with a hammer.
In this experiment I examined infants' ability to repeat the
action of touching two objects in a particular order, after having had
that action modelled for them. If they were successful, then a light
would be turned on and a buzzer sounded, as had happened when the model
performed the action. Infant motivation should be very high in this
experiment; by touching the objects in the correct order the infants
would not only succeed in imitating the mother precisely but they would
also receive the same reinforcement for that act as the model had done.
It would not be sufficient, I considered, for the infant to touch
only one object in imitation. Merely having had their attention
drawn to an object might well predispose infants of this .age to touch
or strike it. If two objects must be touched in a particular order
then since attention m\jst be shifted from the last button the model
touched to the first one she touched for successful imitation to take
place then any reproduction which does take place cannot be ascribed
to attentional factors.
If having been exposed to one model and succeeded in repeating it
the infant is exposed to a different model and soon repeats that also
then the likelihood of this result having occurred, by chance or through
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processes of operant conditioning freest be (ou>.
METHOD
Subjects
Pour female and four male infants, aged 23 - 39 weeks of age
(mean age 209 <lays s.d. 35.8 days) served as subjects.
Apparatus
A table with a blockboard top, 127 x 59 cm. with a semicircle of
radius 18 cm. cut out at the front was used. The cut-out allowed the
infant freedom of action on the table. Three round coloured buttons
(red, yellow and blue) of diameter 3 cm, and thickness 0.5 cm. were
situated in a semicircle 12 cm. apart from each other on the table top,
with one in the midline and the others to right and left, all within
easy reach of the infant. Connected to these buttons from underneath
the table was a 20 x 15 x 8 cm. grey box containing a buzzer; on its
top was a 5 watt light bulb 2 cm. in diameter and a peg-box grid.
This box was in full view of the infant directly in front of him but
out of reach. This was powered by a 12 volt battery out of sight
under the table. By altering the pattern of pegs in the grid the
experimenter changed the sequence of actions needed to activate the
buzzer and light. A Sony CV2100 ACE VTR recorded the infant's
behaviour through a Shibaden HV15S video camera and on AK& microphone,
providing a clear record of the infant's facial and manual behaviour.
Procedure
The infant was seated on the mother's knee in front of the table.
The mother, with her right hand, modelled one of four actions,
encouraged the infant to imitate her (verbally) and then repeated that
action until mother and experimenter thought the infant had learned
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the task or was losing interest. Then one of the other actions was
demonstrated. After a period of time with this model, if the infant
were still interested, a third action was modelled. The mother's
action took 2-3 seconds to complete. On each occasion the mother
demonstrated an action the light went on and the buzzer sounded.
The experiment took place over approximately one week, with each infant
being tested twice in that time.
The four actions were -
I Touch button 1 then button 2
II Touch button 2 then button 1
III Touch button 2 then button 3
IV Touch button 3 then button 2
(Button 1 was to the infant's left, 3 his right, and 2 was in the
midline).
The models of touching the buttons in the sequences 1, 3 and 3»
1 or any involving three buttons were considered too complex for infants
of this age range.
All the infants began with either Model I or Model III, which were
thought to be the easiest movement The other models were then
presented in a counterbalanced order as far as this was possible.




The experimenter noted from the videotape record the number of
demonstrations of each model by the mother and all the instances where
the infant had touched a button. Because of the difficulty of assessing
a truly accidental response, and the bias such an analysis might lead
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to, even those responses which were undoubtedly accidental were
counted e.g. where an infant touched a button with his elbow. Such
responses were comparatively rare. Where an infant touched two
different buttons one after the other in the period following demonstration
by the model this was counted as a sequence, unless this action was
immediately followed by touching the third button and activating the
reinforcement, when the first touch was considered a single touch
and the latter two a sequence. The audio track allowed clear
confirmation of success, i.e. cf the infant triggering the buzzer.
Results of data analysis
All the infants used the right hand most of the time; occasionally
they would touch one button with each hand.
Infants touched a button during their first condition a mean of
9 times (s.d. 7.97), their second 7.5 times (s.d. 5.48) and their
third 8067 times (s.d. 0.58).
The total number of times the infants in this study touched the
buttons singly or in particular sequences is shown in Table 9, with




Total number of infant responses in the four conditions.
Model
1,2 2,1 2,3 3,2
Infant response
2 31.3 3,1 1
I 1,2 (8.43) 7 0 5 0 2 0 5 3 5
11 2,1 (6.5) l 1 2 0 0 l 3 5 4
III 2,3 (4.67) 1 2 6 0 0 0 3 13 20
IV 3,2 (7.25) 3 0 3 5 1 0 2 2 14
Total 12 3 16 5 3 1 13 23 43
2
A X test was carried out on the data for instances of touching
2 buttons, and this gave a significant result (df = 15, X^ = 46.8
p < .001) indicating that the distribution of response was not random }
i.e. that infants did tend to perform the same action as the model.
In considering the models separately, however, it was evident that only
models I and III were imitated (df = 5» X^ = 17.08 p < .01 and
df = 5, X^ = 18.34 p < .01 respectively) while Models II and IV were
not (df - 5 X2 = 3.38, n.s. and df = 5> X^ =8, n.s., respectively).
The results shown in Table 11 seemed to indicate that the infants'
errors when they touched two buttons were not randomly distributed,
and that they were more likely to touch the buttons in the correct
spatial order, i.e. right to left or left to right, than in the wrong
spatial order. Accordingly I calculated the percentage of correct to
incorrect spatial orders of touching the wrong two buttons. However,
the direction of movement of the model produced no difference in the
order of the infants' response; infants touched the buttons in the
direction left-right 75% of the time and right-left 25% of the time,
irrespective of whether the model was right-left or left-right.-
Models I and III were perhaps more likely to be imitated then because
they involved movement in the direction in which the infants were most
likely to move their hands in any case, or infants may have conserved
the direction of the movement of the first model (which was always
left-right) throughout the experiment, i.e. imitated the direction of
the movement. That the latter hypothesis may in fact be correct is
suggested by conparison of the direction of errors in the trial with
the first model compared with the direction of the errors in the
second and third model periods. Whereas 57.1 of the incorrect responses
of touching two buttons were in the direction left-right during the
first model, 91.8 of the incorrect responses in the second and third
modelling periods were in this direction. This result must be regarded
with caution, when the frequency of touching only a single button is
considered.
2
A X test on frequency of touching single buttons was also
significant, where the frequency of touching the same buttons as the
model was compared with the frequency of touching the other (if = 3>
X = 9.5^ p < .02). However, frequency of touching the same buttons
as Models I and II was not significantly different from that which would
be expected by chance (if = 1, X^ = 0 n.s. and df = 1, X^ =0, n.s.)
while the frequency of touching the same buttons as the Model in III
and IV was significantly different from that which would be expected
by chance (df = 1, X^ = 5.5^ P < .02 and df = 1, X^ = A- p < .01
respectively). The parsimonious and most likely explanation of these
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findings is that infants tended to touch the buttons nearest the right
hand, whatever the model, when they touched only a single one.
Another way of analysing these results is to compare accuracy of
the response of touching two buttons over time. If infants were able
to learn to imitate a model on the first presentation, were they able
to transfer this learning to a second model. It is this question which
is most important for this study. Table 12 shows the proportion of
times that infants touched two buttons in the correct to any incorrect
orders, during their first, second and third models.
TABLE 12





It is clear then that the infants' performance did not improve over
time, i.e. any imitation shown in response to the first model did not
transfer to the second or third. It was not the case that the
reduction in accuracy between the first and second and between the
second and third models was a function of infants persisting with the
first or second model when the second or third was presented. Of the
incorrect responses of touching two buttons during the second model only
20^5 were instances of touching the buttons in the order of the first
model, and of the incorrect responses in the third model none were af
the second.
69.
In general, infants were happy and interested in the test, although
frustration and annoyance tended to increase during the trials, as
infants patently failed to achieve their goal, triggering the light
and buzzer. One infant, aged 29 weeks, impressed both his mother and
myself by the ease with which he imitated the model. Model I was
presented ten times, and the infant reproduced this five times, with
one error - touching only the first button in the sequence. Model II
was presented twice, and the infant reproduced this perfectly once,
again making one error - touching only the first button in the sequence
after which he refused to co-operate any further.
DISCUSSION
Although the infants seemed to be interested in the task in this
experiment and their motivation seemed high, o~\X loo-t cv\e failed to
demonstrate any capacity to transfer any learning of imitation from one
model to another model.
It is of interest that Abravanel et al. (1976) found more imitation
of action with objects than action without objects, in a study in which
they presented l+U- infants aged 6, 9, 12 and 15 months with models of
22 actions, e.g. patting an object, scribbling (actions with objects)
* After analysing the results of the experiment I contacted the infant's
mother and asked if she could think of any reason why her infant should
have been able to imitate these actions so much more easily than the
other infants seemed to have been able to do. She told me that she
loved to play the piano, and that the infant had been used from an
early age to accompanying her- a clear example, I assume, of
"pedagogic mania".
mouth opening, tongue protrusion (actions without objects).
With infants of a comparable age to those in this study they found
more evidence of imitation of patting an object than of tongue
protrusion or mouth opening. However Abravanel et al. do not give
precise details of the procedure employed in the control experiment,
where spontaneous behaviour of the modelled actions was noted,with
which behaviour in the treatment groups (those exposed to models)
was compared. I have argued above that any infant of this age is
more likely to touch an object if his attention had been drawn to it
than if it has not; and from the description of the procedure Abravenal
et al. furnish it is not clear whether or not someone drew the
infant's attention to the object in their control experiment.
Piaget's observation that infants of this age are unable to
imitate novel movements systematically even when these involve parts




This experiment was designed to replicate Piaget's finding that
by the age of 18 - 24 months children could act on the basis of
literal or pictorial representations. Thus at 15 months J. lay
down and pretended to sleep on a "pillow" which was in fact a rubber
donkey's tail (Piaget 1945/62 obs. 64). At 18 months of age J.
noticed a photograph in a newspaper of a boy with his mouth cpen,
whereupon she opened her own mouth. The ability to recognise
pictorial representations of objects is unlearned, according to
Hochberg and Brooks (1962). They report that an infant brought up
with hardly any experience of pictorial representation and no training
in pictorial meaning could at 19 months of age correctly name line
drawings and photographs of familiar objects on their first
presentation. That the infant recognised both types of
representation implies that the fidelity of the representation is
not crucial, as he was shown the line drawings first. Other
investigators have however found that photographs are recognised
faster, by older subjects, when presented tachistoscepically than
are line drawings (Ryan and Schwartz, 1956; Fraisee and Elkin, 1963).
The design of an experiment to study the phenomenon of ability
to act on the basis of a representation posed some problems, not
least of which was that an action is difficult to represent in a
static form. To present representations of facial or bodily move¬
ment to infants at this stage of development did not seem worthwhile.
The infants would either imitate or not imitate. If they did not,
it would be impossible to conclude this was a result of inability to
recognise the picture, of reluctance to perform the task, or of
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unfamiliarity with the gesture, or for some other reason.
I therefore decided to present representations cf different
fidelity of an object permanence task. By the age of 18 months or
so (Piaget 1937/55) infants are able to discover a hidden object
even though its displacements are invisible and must be inferred.
If infants could find a hidden object when its displacement was
completely invisible and must be inferred from a representation of
its eventual location then it would be clear that they not only
recognised the representation but could act on it. They would
understand that the representation actually stood for the object-
permanenoe task, using representation in its second sense.
METHOD
Subjects
4 girls and 4 boys of age ranging from 19 - 33 months (mean age
25.56 months, s.d. 5.63 months) served as subjects. All had been
exposed to picture books, television etc., and all had been tested
with a version of Stage V of Piaget's object permanence task, and
heen successful.
Apparatus and stimuli
The infant was seated on the mother's knee in front of a table
with a blockboard top measuring 127 by 59 cm. on which were 2 cups
of base diameter 7 cm. and height 9 cm. which were about 12 cm. apart.
One of these was yellow and the other multicoloured. The cups were
placed horizontally with respect to the infant and on each side of
the midline. The stimuli used by the experimenter fell into four
Categories, the first three of which were pictorial and the fourth
literal.
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1. Glossy full colour Polaroid photographs measuring
11.5 x 9 cm. showing the two cups on the table, with one
tipped slightly back to show a raisin underneath it. The
cups were approximately half real size. There were four
of these photographs; every combination of position cf
cups and raisin could be presented.
2. Glossy black and white Polaroid photographs identical
in size and content to those in Category 1.
3. Line drawings on a piece of white paper (25 x 20 cm)
showing two cups with one tipped back to expose a raisin.
The cups were full size. There were two of these drawings;
ih one the raisin was under the cup on the left, in the
other under the cup on the right.
4. Two more cups identical to those in front of the infant.
Procedure
The infant sat on the mother's knee in front of the table, and
was presented with twelve trials of each of the tasks in the four
categories, in a counterbalanced order of categories and a random
order of position of cups within categories. The procedure in
Categories 1 - Jiisls for the experimenter to place in front of the
child the two test cups, under one of which a raisin had been hidden.
Then I gave the infant the photograph or line drawing to look at
saying "look at the picture". After twenty seconds or so I retrieved
the picture and held it directly above the cups but slightly behind
them and said "now you find a raisin". If the child did find the
raisin at the first attempt, he was allowed to eat it. If he made
no move or pointed to the raisin in the picture, I said "now you
pick up a cup and find a raisin" and if he chose the wrong cup, I
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removed the cups and went on to the next trial. For the tests in the
fourth Category I hid a raisin under the other set of cups, to the
right of the test set and slightly behind, so as to be out of-'reach.
Then I lifted the correct cup several times, pointing out the raisin
and saying "look, there's a raisin" and then "now you find a raisini'
If the child made a move towards the other set I said "no, not those
cups". Mothers had been asked beforehand not to say anything to help
the children, and the relation between the photographs, drawings and
real cups was never explained.
RESULTS
I marked on a scoresheet whether or not the infant had succeeded
in obtaining the raisin on the first attempt, and if he did so this
was counted as a pass. Efforts to lift both cups (which were frequent)
were counted as failures. In Categories where the infant had refused
to continue a failure was scored. A complete pass for any Category
was allowed if the infant succeeded on 757° cf trials, which result
has a probability of p ^ .07 of arising by chance (Binomial Test).
Table 10 shows the results of the experiment.
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TABLE 10
Success rates as a percentage of t otal number of trials with the
four categories of stimuli
Infants by age
CATEGORY
1. (Coloured) 2. (black & white) 3. (line) e. (real)
1. 66.67 - 66.67
2. 58.33 - 50.00
5. 50.00 - 50.00
4. 41.67 41.67 33.33 41.67
5. 83.33 58.33 66.67
6. 50.00 75.00 5^.55
7. 100.00 100.00 75.00 58.33
8. 100.00 83.33 33.33 75.00
Mean 68.57 70.83 54.15 58.33
s.d. 23.04 25.91 24.08 10.91
- not completed.
It is clear that only the two oldest infants passed on more than
two Categories, and that Categories 3 and. 4 were particularly difficult
for all the children. Younger infants typically cried, and refused
to continue, threw the cups on the floor, kicked the table, etc.,
particularly with tasks in Categories 2 and 3. Frustration was
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very evident from their behaviour. Three resorted to always picking
up the cup on one partiuular side, but even this partial success (as
far as eating raisins was concerned) was not sufficient to sustain
their interest.
To test the effects of practice the two youngest infants repeated
the experiment at weekly intervals until they refused to continue.
Because the procedure might have been too long on tneir first
experimental session they were tested only on 12 trials of Category 1
and 12 of Category 4» The procedure was modified in Category 4.
The raisin was left visible, just under the lip of the cup. The
results of this second part of the experiment are shown in Table 11.
TABLE 11





1 1 50.0 66.67 50.00 50.00
1 4 50.0 58.33 50.0 66.67
2 1 6.67 50.00
2 4 50.00 50.00
/
Both infants were conpletely unsuccessful even with this practice,
and by the end of the experimental trials were absolutely fed up with
the whole situation. Infant 1 resorted to picking up both cups
every time, and Infant 2 to picking up the left cup every time.
Even the fact that the raisin was perfectly visible underneath the
cup in Category 4 trials did not improve the performance.
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DISCUSSION
That the infants' inability to succeed in these experiments was
not due to a failure to recognise the stimuli was quite apparent rrom
their reaction when asked to find a raisin, since they all at some
time pointed to the raisin in a picture or tried to reach the other
set of cups in Category The difference in behaviour between
younger and older infants with the stimuli in Categories 1-3 was
striking; younger infants often threw them on the floor, tried to
turn them upside down, laid them face down on the table, and so on,
while older infants did seem to attend to them carefully before
making a choice. It was quite clear the younger infants saw
absolutely no connection between the most veridical of pictorial
representations of the cups and the real cups juat below those
representations. More surprising still was the failure of all but
one of the infants to comprehend the relation between the literal
representations in Category 4 and the test cups. Their attention
had been drawn to only one of the cups; I had modelled lifting that
cup and finding a raisin; lifting cups could hardly be likely to be
novel experience, and yet the infants could not choose the correct
test cup more frequently than would be expected by chance. That
the infants forgot which cup the raisin was under was hardly a
likely explanation. The time elapsing between the conclusion
of the demonstration and the infant's being allowed to choose a cup
could have been at the most two or three seconds. In any case, even
when the raisin was left completely visible under the stimulus cup
in tests of Category 4 with the youngest infants, they could not
use this information to help them in choosing the correct test cup.
I therefore decided that longitudinal testing of older infants might




This experiment was basically the same as Experiment 6, except
that the stimuli in Categories 1 and 2 were 24 x 16.5 cm. photographs
of the cups, showing them exactly full size, which I thought might
make the task easier. In addition, all vocalisations made by the
children which pertained to the experiment were noted. I had
observed that the only child who had passed in three categories in
Experiment VI had commented on the photographs before choosing a cup,
and thought this might be relevant.
Subjects
Three boys, aged 2 years, 2 years 4 months and 2 years 8 months
served as subjects. None had been subjects in Experiment VI. Two
of the children were tested weekly until they had succeeded in all
tasks. These children took five and six weeks cf testing before they
passed all items. The other child was tested for five weeks, but
by the end of that period he was so difficult to test his mother felt
it was not right to make him continue. All the children passed a
preliminary test of a version of Piaget's Stage VI Object Permanence
task.
Procedure
The procedure was as in Experiment VI. If an infant passed in
one category for two weeks in succession, then on the third week he
was given a reversal trial (for Categories 1, 2 and 4) where the test
cups were reversed left to right or right to left of the stimulus
cups. For example, if the raisin was under the yellow cup in the
representation, and that cup was on the right of one picture, then the
yellow cup with raisin was on the child's left. Thus it could be
determined whether the child was using the features of the cup in the
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representation (its colour) in guiding his choice or merely its
location, i.e. the position of the cup to right or left. No such
reversal trials could be given with Category 3, so if infants-passed
in this Category on two successive occasions, they were not tested
with that Category again.
RESULTS
Each infant's scores on the five occasions of testing with the
four categories are shown in tables 12, 13 and 14. Successes are
marked with an asterisk and reversal trials with an R. Where
pertinent vocalisation occurred during a trial, the entry for that
Category is underlined.
TABLE 12
Results of infant (A) aged 2 years at start of testing.
Category Trials (order of presentation in parentheses).
•
1 (3214) 2 (2314) 3 (4312) 4 (1342) 5 (3412)
1 58.33 41.6 58.33 58.33 75.00x
2 58.33 58.33 66.67 66.67 50.00
3 25.00 66.6~] 58.33 50.00 50.00
It- 50.00 41.67 58.33 66.67 25.00
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TABLE 13
Results of infant (B) aged 2 years 4 months at start of testing.
Categories Trials (order of presentation in parentheses)
1 (4231) 2 (1234) 3 (3412) 4 (2143) 5 (134)
1 58.33 66067 ?1.67X 91.673c R 91.67x
2 25.00 75.OOx 100.OOx R 85.33X
3 33.33 50.00 50.00 66.67 83.33x
4 66.67 50.00 91.67x 91.675c R 91.67x
TABLE 34
Results of infant (C) aged 2 years 8 months at start cf testing.
Categories Trials (order of presentation in parentheses)
1 (4312) 2 (3142) 3 (2143) 4 (132) 5 (213) 6 (1)
1 58.33 58.33 83.33x 91.67x R 50.00 R91.67x
2 66.67 66.67 75.00x 100x ■' R 100.OQx
3 33.33 66.67 58.33 83.33x 100.OOx
4 83.33x 91.67x R 83.33x
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Table 15 shows the mean success rates on trials in a particular Category




trial previous to the first pass trial in the
Infant Category
1 2 3 4
A 58.33 - - -
B 58.33 25.00 66.67 50.00
C 58.33 66.67 58.33 -
Mean 58.33 45.84 62.5 50.00
In successful trials with the tasks in the various Categories,
the children typically studied the representation before making a
choice; on one occasion a child arrested a movement towards the
wrong cup, looked at the photograph again and picked up the correct
cup.
DISCUSSION
Infant A passed trials in Category 1 first, while Infant B passed
the Categories in the order 2413 and Infant C in the order 4213, and
so the order of difficulty of solving tasks in the different Categories
cannot be assessed, although it would seem that Category 3 was most
difficult. The fact that on five of the possible six reversal trials
the infants succeeded in passing the test first time indicates that
they were using the features of the correct cup in the representation
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to guide their choice and not its location.
Nevertheless since the children did manage to pass in Category 3
where feature identification was not possible and only position
information was available, it is obvious that position information
could be used. The lack of featural information may well have made
this task most difficult, particularly when the vocalisation evidence
is considered. The only vocalisation which occurred in a Category 3
task was "just like the pictures", while vocalisations in the other
Categories included "it's the same" "not the yellow one" "it's the
same, spotty one". These children did not seem to be able to identify
position by the lateLs left and right, but could identify the different
colour features. "It's the same" meant "it's the same colour" since
this vocalisation took place on a reversal trial.
Vocalisation did not seem to be a necessary prerequisite to
passing a test, although vlcalisation occurred on 44.44$ of first
successful trials in any Category. The children seemed to be informing
the experimenter of the strategy they were using to solve the problem.
However, that the younger infants could not solve this task because
they had no means of relating the representation linguistically
(whether articulated or not) to the tasks seems likely. In this
experiment the youngest child, whose speech was less well developed
than that of the older children, succeeded on only one task after 24-0
trials with the stimuli.
That one child passed in Category 2 first suggests that it was
not the pictorial nature of the stimuli in Categories 1, 2 and 3 which
made these Categories difficult, and that both successful children
passed in all the different categories within a relatively short
period implies that the same ability was being tested in each Category
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of tasks. Children were performing at a chance level on the test
before the first successful test in each Category, indicating that
this ability is discontinuous.
All the mothers complained that the children repeatedly asked them
about the experiment at home and that they disliked prevaricating
about the nature of the task, and although they had been asked not
to tell the children how to do the task, they may have inadvertently
given them hints; for example, by referring to the cups by colour.
The means by which the children solved these tasks cannot be
ascertained from this study. What is interesting is that the tasks
were so extraordinarily difficult for the children, and that the degree
of difficulty seemed not to be related to the fidelity of the
representations of the test situation but to the difficulty the
child had in relating the cups in the representation to the cups in
the test situation. The children seemingly could not see that the
stimuli represented the test situation without the mediation of
language, articulated or not. This took place in a situation in
which imitation was possible, i.e. in Category 4. The child need
only repeat the experimenter's action to be successful in finding the
raisin.
The fact that experimenter and subject were acting on different
objects should not have been relevant; Piaget did not observe infants
trying to pull his hair at 13 months of age after he had done so;
they pulled their own hair.
Thus at an age when children are capable of deferred imitation of
complex acts seen many hours previously, of images and af material
objects, and of producing their own metaphors, (Piaget 1945/62) in a
situation in which one set of objects must be taken to represent another
set of objects the children are not immediately successful.
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CHAPTER 11
IMITATION IN EARLY INFANCY : A REVIEW
The results of Experiments V - VII must be treated with the caution
obligatory in dealing with negative results. I shall discuss the limited
implications of these experiments in Chapter 16. However, I believe that
the fact that some of the findings reported in Experiments I - IV have been
confirmed by independent research in imitation (Maratos 1973; Melzoff and
Moore, 1977) allow more detailed consideration of that section of my thesis.
I describe these other studies below.
Maratos's study
Maratos studied 12 female infants, who were tested in their homes
every fortnight from 1-6 months of age. A variety of gestures were
performed in front of the infant and the infant's behaviour recorded on a
checklist by hand. Maratos compared the frequency of the movements made
by the infant during the modelling period with the frequency during a 12
minute haseline period before testing began, during which the frequency of
all the behaviours to be modelled had been noted (by hand). There were three
groups of tests and these groups were presented to the infants in random
order. These were -
Visual 1. Tongue protrusion.
2. Tongue protrusion accompanied by the sound "m".
3. Head shaking.
4. Head shaking accompanied by the sound "a".
5. Opening and closing the mouth.
6. Moving the fingers,
and from 4-5 months
7. Bringing hands together.
8. Scratching and banging.
Kinesthetic
9. Batys leg straightened and bent rhythmically by E.
10. Baby's arm taken by elbow and moved up and down parallel
to the body.
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11. Both legs straightened and bent alternately by E.
Auditory
12. Vowel sounds in infant's repertoire.
13. A recording of another infant babbling.
14. A recording cf another infant crying.
Each test was repeated three times. The imitation Maratos found
seemed to vary with age. Thus infants did imitate Test 1, Test 2 and
Test 5 up to two months cf age and 3 and. 4 up to four months of age,
while 6 was not imitated until two months cf age. One infant continued
to protrude the tongue in imitation until 3 months cf age. Results
for tests 7 and 8 are not reported. Test 9 was imitated at one month,
while 10 was not imitated until about 2 months of age. The results
for Test 11 are not reported and those for 12-14 need not concern us
here.
Maratos' results with respect to tongue protrusion, mouth opening
and finger movement are consonant with my own. It is interesting
that Maratos also found tongue protrusion to be imitated more often
than mouth opening; but the result for head shaking is surprising,
given that her infants were in the same position as the infants in
Experiment I, i.e. supine with a pillow as head support. On 24 out
of a possible 36 (12 infants x 3 trials) occasions, the infants were
observed to move their heads. This occurred in only 5 out cf the
possible 144 (12 infants x 12 time periods) occasions in the baseline
period. This discrepancy between Maratos' result and my own, may in
fact, be due to her applying less stringent criteria. Thus an imitative
response is "a quick slight horizontal movement of the head round the
mid line" while the spontaneous movements are "of greater amplitude
and slower than the movement obtained in limitation cf the model"
85.
(Maratos, 1973). This "imitative response" is not the imitation of
head shaking Piaget described.
Melzoff and Moore's study
Melzoff and Moore's (1977) study is more interesting, not least
because it reports findings cf facial and manual gestures in infants
less than three weeks of age - in fact Melzoff noted tongue protrusion
in imitation at the age of one hour. In the first study six




4. Opening and closing the hand while moving the fingers.
Each of these movements ras modelled four times in 15 seconds, and then
E (the model) kept his face still for 20 seconds.
The infants' behaviour was videotaped. The tapes were scored by
observers unaware of which of the models was present. Some were
asked to rank-order four possible models of facial movement (mouth
opening, tongue protrusion, lip protrusion, passive face), as to
which they thought most likely to be the model for the tape recording
in question. Other coders assessed the finger movement data, rank
ordering four possible models of hand movement (sequential finger
movement, finger protrusion, hand opening or passive hand) as to
which was the most likely to be being presented. The coders were
significantly more likely to identify the correct than an incorrect
model for both facial and manual gestures.
These results are consistent with my own, except for the sequential
finger movement data. I did not find evidence cf a simpler hand
behaviour being imitated before 13 weeks of age. Melzoff and Moore
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report no baseline measures (for the passive face condition, for
example), in this study, and it may well be the case that sequential
finger movement is simply a more common movement than finger protrusion,
passive hand or hand opening under any conditions of stimulation.
Alternatively, infants may be more adept at this form of imitation at
2-3 weeks than at 3 - 13 weeks.
Melzoff and Moore considered that E might still be influencing
the infants' behaviour in the first e^eriment reported, shaping their
behaviour to seeming imitation by subtle alterations in the stimulus;
in their second experiment, they employed a different procedure to
exclude this possibility.
They found imitation of tongue protrusion and mouth opening in
twelve infants aged 2-3 weeks when the infant was prevented (by a
pacifier) from making these movements during the modelling periods.
This procedure prevented the experimenter from giving any possible
reinforcement. The results were as shown in Table 16.
TABLE 16
Total number of tongue protrusions and mouth opening movements in the
baseline period and under two conditions of stimulation (Melzoff and
Moore, 1977)





Tongue protrusion 15 40 • 34
Mouth opening 2 2 8
Each of the 12 infants was exposed to each of the models for 130
seconds. The mean frequency of tongue protrusions for infants exposed
to that model in Melzoff and Moore's study was thus 3»33> and for mouth
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opening when mouth opening was modelled was O.67. These results are
markedly lower than those I obtained in Experiments II and III where
the corresponding means were 12.08 and 7.285 respectively (for. 5
minutes and 1+ minutes).
This anomaly may simply be a consequence of the difference in
procedure between the two studies; or may have arisen because as
Piaget states, the mother is more readily imitated than a stranger;
Melzoff and Moore's criteria for imitation may have been more stringent
than mine; or the mothers may have been influencing the infant's
behaviour in my study in non-obvious ways. I have already given the
reasons why I think this latter hypothesis to have been unlikely.
Melzoff and Moore do not comment on the disparity in'frequency of
the two movements, tongue protrusion and mouth opening, and yet this
is an interesting finding, confirming my own. Since the mouth must
be opened (at least slightly) in order to protrude the tongue, it can
hardly be the case that one movement is more difficult to make than the
other.
Melzoff and Moore postulate that the infant can represent visually
and proprioceptively perceived information in some form common to both.
Thus, all he need do in order to be able to imitate is to compare his
own sensory information about parts of his body he cannot see with some
"supramodal" representation of the visually perceived gesture and
construct the match required. "Supramodal" is used as it is in Bower
(1977). Presumably the infant acts, possibly incorrectly, and then
compares, and then having made the match acts again; but if this model
not
is correct it is^surprising infants are not more precise in their
imitative movements, which Melzoff and Moore characterise as being
"lacking in stereotype"; by which presumably they mean inexact as well
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as different. Infants surely cannot represent proprioceptively
perceived information in a common form with visually perceived
information until they have obtained the proprioceptively perceived
information, i.e. made the movement. Having made this movement in
Melzoff and Moore's study infants did not it seems on the mouth opening
evidence go on to act again.
Melzoff and Moore conclude that the ability to act on the basis of
an abstract representation of a perceptually absent stimulus may be the
start and not the culmination of psychological development (as Piaget
believed). Their study did not demonstrate deferred imitation, which
takes place in the absence of the model, and not simply when the model
has ceased to make a particular movement; this conclusion is unjustified.
The results of the four studies cf early infant imitation cf some
facial and hand movements (Gardner and Gardner, 1970; Maratos, 1973;
Melzoff and Moore 1977) and that reported in this thesis are presented
in Table 17.
TABLE 17
Age at which evidence of imitation cf a number of movements has
been found in four studies.






D M G & G
M & M
M & M D G & G
Lip protrusion M & M
Head shaking M D
Head nodding D
Finger movement M D
Eye closing D
It seems likely that young infants are capable of imitation of
certain facial movements, although the data on head, hand and finger
movement is open to other interpretation. That older infants.- are
not able or willing to make all of these movements is well-documented,
e.g. Piaget's (1945/1962) Uzgiris' (1972) and Maratos* (1973)
longitudinal studies.
EXPLANATION OF RESULTS
TiThy should infants be capable of imitation in the early weeks of
life and yet seemingly be incapable of imitating the same acts a few
months later, and then later still be capable again?
There are several explanations of this phenomenon of seeming
early infant imitation which could obviate the necessity of classifying
it as true imitation.
Firstly, the imitation observed was not always reproducible on
another occasion of testing. "Pseudo-imitation" as described by
Piaget is also not reproducible on subsequent occasions. It occurs
when there is mutual imitation. Thus, if an infant protrudes the
tongue, and an adult repeats this movement, the infant may protrude the
tongue again; this occurs because
"a temporary association is formed, which makes him
continue the action, the model then serving as a
stimulating signal" (Piaget 1945/62)
In Experiments I - IV I took pains that the infant should not have
made the movement to be modelled before the model herself did so.
However, pseudo-imitation may in some cases be lasting, according to
Piaget;
"
... training leads to pseudo-imitation; which can
be produced much more easily and therefore takes place
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earlier (than true imitation) tending, since it is
kept up by practice, to overshadow the manifestations
of spontaneous assimilation" (Piaget 1945/62).
In this case the infant is conpletely unaware of the correspondence
between his action and the model's action; he makes the correct
movement, possibly by chance, and this association is strengthened
by the adult's show of approval. Piaget is proposing that the adult
can shape the infant's behaviour to a seeming imitation. In my
experiments, however, the mothers were unaware of the purpose of the
experiments, and so were unlikely to be shaping the infants' behaviour
to my satisfaction; and if they were doing so, if they did in fact
practise with the infants between tests, then their efforts were
rather ineffectual. Why should they succeed with tongue protrusion
and mouth movement, but not with finger movement, head shaking and so
on? In any case, were the mothers training the infants one would
expect an amelioration of performance on the second occasion of
testing, and not a deterioration - which was generally the case.
A second explanation might be that this phenomenon is similar
in nature to other infant abilities which are present in the first weeks
of life but which disappear and then reappear later, e.g. walking (Zeizo
et al.1972) and reaching (Bower et al. 1970a, Bower 1974). In. the
case of imitation, the infant might have some innate tendency to
imitate certain acts, which might even be reflexive, and which did
not involve representation. This however does not seem to be a
sufficient explanation. In the first place, in normal circumstances
reaching and walking disappear entirely, to reappear at some later
date in the infant's repertoire. The longitudinal reports of infant
imitative development give widely divergent observations to the age
of attainment of imitation of the same and different actions, but
there is no age at which imitation cannot be elicited, if the
observations in those reports are considered as a whole (Valentine
1930, Piaget 1945, Maratos 1973)• Both reaching and walking ban be
elicited from every normal baby in the right circumstances. This is
patently not the case with infant imitation. Nor can it be assumed
that the circumstances were uniformly adverse, since most infants
imitated one gesture during the experiments I conducted.
A third explanation is that imitation in early infancy is in fact
not imitation at all, but a fixed-action pattern^ with the model's
action the sign-stimulus, to use Tinbergen's (1951) term. A hungry
herring gull chick will peck at the red spot on its parent's bill soon
after hatching; it will not peck so frequently at spots of different
colour. The red patch is the sign-stimulus for pecking by the chick;
and this response is adaptive, since it leads to the chick being fed.
Eibl-Eibesfeldt (1978) has recently proposed that such a mechanism
underlies early infant imitation. If this were so, it would be the
only known case of the sign-stimulus and the response being identical.
One would expect that the response would be reliably elicited in all
infants in a well-developed form, and yet imitation seems to be difficult
to elicit in some infants. Even those who do imitate show evidence of
learning before they produce the correct response, as I have already
described. If fixed action patterns underlay imitation of mouth
opening and tongue protrusion, which has been observed in very young
infants in my own studies and in those by Melzoff and Moore, then it
is surprising that both these studies find that the latter occurs more
frequently than the former. Nor can this hypothesis explain why infants
should cease to imitate certain models, and begin to imitate new ones at
later ages.
oo
It seems then that neither explanations of pseudo-imitation, operant
conditioning nor fixed-action patterns are sufficient to explain the
phenomenon of seeming imitation.
However, it is still the case that the imitation observed in young
infants seems to be most easily and reliably obtained to a model moving
a part of the face. It might be true that facial movement is somehow
privileged in imitative behaviour, and that the competence is not general.
The knowledge that facial movement is a large component in social inter¬
action lends support to such an hypothesis. Ishall discuss the question
of how imitative performance might be achieved, and in which circumstances,
in Chapter 16.
An argument against any imitation of facial movement in particular
could be made on the basis of the large body of data on infant smiling.
This appears to show that infant discrimination of facial features is
extremely limited. As recently as 19^9, the evidence from these studies
could be accurately summarised thus
"by five months of age several features of the human face
have been perceptually differentiated : its plastic, solid
surface; the eyes as features; the eyes in a characteristic
orientation; the mouth as a feature; an oval head shape.
But individual faces are not yet differentiated, nor are
expressions (smiling and crying). After five months ...
alteration of contour and feature arrangement are noted.
The uniqueness of individual faces is appreciated some time
around six to seven months" E.J. Gibson 1969.
Such limited discriminative ability would not permit an infant to
differentiate between e.g. an opening of the mouth ana a protrusion of
the tongue. Nonetheless, these conclusions were drawn in large part
from the classical studies of smiling.
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A recent experiment on smiling I carried out with T.G.R. Bower is
apposite to the question of infant discriminative ability.
x A paper based on this research, "Quantitative and Qualitative
differences in the smiles of infants 6 to 12 weeks old" by




The infant smile has been used as an indicator of discrimination
in numerous experiments. The results of many of these investigations
have seemed to show that although besotted parents might wish to
attach meaning to the fact that infants smile at them, this is not the
simple case it appears. Infants seem only to be smiling at faces as
an example (which is not particularly effective) of a certain class of
stimuli likely to elicit smiling. That is, infants will smile as
readily to a strange as to a familiar face, or to a conpletely
different stimulus. If infants show such indiscriminate response at
the relatively advanced age at which they begin to smile, then an
argument for even younger infants' ability to discriminate the movements
of individual features in a face is difficult to defend.
Before considering the different hypotheses as to the origin of
social smiling, and the experimental evidence in support of those
hypotheses, the first question to consider is when the social smile
actually appears, and environmental effects on its date of appearance.
Time of origin of social smile
The nativist hypothesis is that the smile emerges, fully-formed
at some date after birth, elicited by e.g. high-contrast stimuli or
by some aspect of human beings, etc. The empiricist hypothesis is
that the time of emergence of the first smile will depend on environ¬
mental events in the infant's life, e.g. how long he has been given
sufficient experience of response-contingent relations to be able to
detect contingencies, or the age at which he can discriminate familiar
from non-familiar objects.
When does the smile first occur then? It has been observed that
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premature infants smile at the conceptual age of 4 - 5 weeks (Dittr j.chova,
1969) indicating that their longer exposure to events in the environment
did not accelerate the appearance of smiling, since that is the age at
which normal infants smile. Infants in an institution where they
received minimal social interaction with adults or other children were
observed to smile socially at the same age as other infants (Provence
and Lipton 19^2). However, other investigators have found that amount
of social stimulation does affect age of onset of social smiling (Spitz
and Wolf, 194^J Wolff 19^3; Ambrose 19^1; Gewirtz, 1965).
A recent study by Foley (1977) found that the first social smile
in premature infants was postponed by pre-term delivery by a factor
equal to approximately half the deficit in gestational age. Her 51
subjects were either premature or premature and light-for-dates, so
the possible effects of low birth weight were controlled. In addition,
the subjects were drawn from two different hospitals and there were
significant differences between the infants age of first smile
depending on which hospital they were born in.
The results of Foley's study suggest that there may be a genetically
determined age before which social smiling cannot be elicited, but that
the appearance of social smiling after that age can be delayed or
accelerated by environmental factors.
Hypotheses about the origin of the social smile
The hypotheses about the origins of the first social smiles which
have been proposed can be classed as shown below.
1. The smile as on innate response to social stimulation
Bowlby (1969) and Freedman (1974) propose that the form of the
infant's smile is innately given; the organism is so biased that some
stimuli (e.g. eye-spots) are more effective than others in eliciting it,
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and these effective stimuli are most likely to emanate from adults
in the environment than from any other source. Bowlby believes
the range of those effective stimuli becomes restricted to those of
human origin through processes of learning. Freadman believes that
reinforcement is not a causal mechanism in social smiling on the
evidence of his study of a blind infant (Freeaman, 1964).
2. The smile as an index of recognition of familiarity
Piaget (1936/53} concludes from a study of early infant smiling
that "The smile is primarily a reaction to familiar images, to what
has already been seen". He also describes the smile as a form of pseudo-
imitation, which can be kept tip under the influence of repeated stim¬
ulation (Piaget 1945/62}. There is no intentional convergence
between the infant's smile and the model's smile. Kagan has also
argued for the smile as a response of recognition; in a study of infant
smiling to sculptured face-like stimuli he found that by four months of
age infants smiled more to the most realistic of these. This
indicated that the infants had developed a schema for human faces,
since they differentiated between the stimuli (Kagan et al 1966}.
3. The smile as a response to high-contrast stimuli
Ahrens (1954) found in a study of institutionalised infants that
a pair of dots on a card were the most effective elicitors of smiles
in infants up until 12 weeks of age after which age face-like patterns
became more effective. Six dots were even more effective than two.
Ahrens compared the infant smile with the patterns of behaviour noted
in bird chicks by ethologists, and concluded that the smile was
"released" by the "sign-stimulus" af the eye-like dots; a card with
six dots on it was thus a "super-normal sign stimulus" (Freadman, 1974).
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Salzen (19&3) reported that any change in brightness was likely to
produce smiling in 7 - 8 week old infants, with a moving face being
no more effective than any other stimulus used.
4. The smile as an index of contingency detection
Watson (1973) and Hunt and Uzgiris (1964) both noted that young
infants tended to smile during experiments where some external event
was under the infant's control. Watson proposed that the infants
were smiling in response to the detection of the contingent relation
between their movement and its sequelae. The prototypical games
which mothers may play with a young infant, e.g. tickling him every
time he turns round, provide opportunities (ibr the infant to detect a
contingency between some specific behaviour and an event in the outside
world. Watson believes that social responses develop through just
such perception of cause and effect relationships (Watson 1978). In
an experiment with eight week old infants he found that those infants
whose head turning produced movement of a mobile suspended over them
smiled after several days of experience in this situation. Other
infants exposed to mobiles whose movement was non-contingent on
infant behaviour did not smile.
Bower (1977) proposed that one way to clarify the issue of the
ontogenesis of social smiling might be to consider the smile not as a
unitary concept but to examine it qualitatively. Nuraery school
children and adults have been shown to smile in different ways in
different situations (Brannigan and Humphries, 1969, 1972, G-rant 1969);
might not infants also produce different smiles in different situations?
Experiment 8 was designed to test this hypothesis, and to gather





This experiment was designed to test Bower's (1977) hypothesis




Twenty four infants (14 female, 10 male) served as subjects.
Their ages ranged from 49 - 91 days (mean 68.25 days, s. d. 15.72 days).
Two other boys cried persistently both times they were brought to the
laboratory and had to be eliminated from the sample. Five subjects
cried on their first visit and were re-scheduled.
All were reported by their mothers to have started to smile - in
the case of the youngest infants only a few days before testing. All
were full-term, except for one pair of monozygotic twin girls, the
oldest subjects in the sample.
Proc edure
Infants were settled by their mothers into an upright baby chair,
and were supported by blankets. The four conditions, each lasting two
minutes, were presented to the infants in a counterbalanced order.
A Sony AV3620 ACE VTR in an adjoining room recorded the full face
image of the infant via a Shibadon HV 15S camera. An AKG- microphone
and a For-A-CO VTG- 33 timer were connected to the VTR.
Stimuli
Condition I: Contingency detection. Completely out of sight behind
the infant, I briefly rattled a 4 x 4 cm. rattle in sight of the infant
to his right each time the infant moved his right hand any appreciable
distance (4-5 cms). In the case of an active infant as time went on
I shaped the behaviour towards a larger movement towards the rattle.
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Condition 2: High contrast stimuli. Completely out of sight behind
the infant, I slowly moved a piece cf white card (29.5 x 20.8 cm)
towards and away from the infant's face, along his line of sight
30° to the right, through approximately 40 cms. On the card were
six round black dots arranged vertically in pairs, of 4 cm. diameter,
about 1 cm. under than the transverse section of the human adult eye.
Centre to centre horizontally the dots were 6 cm. apart, approximately
the separation of adult eyes, and 6 cm. apart centre to centre vertically.
Condition 3 J Mother. The infant's mother was asked to make her infant
smile without touching him or speaking to him. Mothers smiled, nodded
and moved their lips as if speaking, standing to the infant's right,
with their faces approximately 30 cms. apart.
Condition 1+: Stranger. I did not interact with the infant at all until
the beginning of this condition. I stood in the same position at the
mothers, smiling and nodding constantly, and moved my lips occasionally.
Analysis
Brannigan and Humphries (l9o9) classification of smiles could
obviously not be used, relying as they did on amount of tooth and gum
exposure. Using Etzel and Gewirtz' definition of a smile -
"an elongation of the mouth upward and outward, a
deepening of the naso-labial folds from the corners of
the mouth to the wings of the nose (lines), mouth may
be open, wrinkles may form at the outer corners of the
eyes as the eyes narrow, and the cheeks may bulge under
the eyes"
(1967) which of the astoundingly diverse grimaces were and were not
smiles was decided. If the elongation of the mouth was not accompanied
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either by movement at the outer edge upwards, or by crinkling of the
eyes, the grimace was not counted as a smile. Eye crinkling could be
assessed by covering the mouth area. If eye crinkling was apparent,
this expression still looked like a smile. Some infants persisted
in what can only be described as "smirking" - which may correspond
to the "pleased expressions" Washburn (1929) described in much older
infants; although the mouth did not move, nor the eyes wrinkle
appreciably, the infants somehow gave the inpression of smiling. Such
smiles (which only occurred in Conditions 3 and 4) were not counted.
The number of smiles in each condition from each infant was noted.
The latency and duration of each smile was assessed by means of the
timer. Duration could only be accurately assessed by moving the tape
backwards by hand and discovering a point at which there was no trace
of smiling left.
Qualitative aspects of the smile were also noted. Timed analysis
of the changes in the facial configuation were made for each smile,
following Etzel and Gewirtz' description (1967). Eye and mouth movements
were timed from onset to change or cessation, and in addition looking
towards or away from the stimulus and moving the hand to the mouth or
the head back were recorded. Movements of the tongue while smiling
were also noted: Brannigan and Hunphries noticed that tongue protrusion
occurred in "excited play" or "delighted surprise" in nursery school
children (1972).
Eye movements:
(1) Eye crinkling, defined as narrowing the eyes so that wrinkling
appeared at the outer canthi.
(2) Closing the eyes.
Mouth movements:
(1) Mouth curling up at the outer edges, at both sides, or at one (gr
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(2) Mouth extending horizontally.
(3) Mouth extending vertically.
Originally there were to be four categories of degree cf mouth .opening
(a) Mouth closed (score 0)
(b) Mouth slightly open (score 1)
(c) Mouth half open (score 2)
(d) Mouth fully open (score 3)
but a fifth, (e) mouth very fully open (score 4) had to be appended when
some infants managed to open their mouths to an amazing extent.
Tongue behaviour
(1) No appearance of tongue
(2) Tongue inside at edge of lip or tongue protruded beyond lips.
Looking behaviours were
(1) Looking at stimulus while smiling
(2) Looking away from stimulus during or at the end of a smile.
In addition note was made of all instances of moving the head back,
and of putting a hand to the mouth.
Results
The use of chi-square to compare the smiles of the same infants
across different conditions is not strictly legitimate; since the
subjects in each condition comprised the same infants, clearly there
will be sbme correlation. Since, however, such a correlation would
act to reduce the significance of any real differences between smiles,
we regard the use of this statistic as conservative, in underestimating
any true differences.
Table 18 shows the number of smiles produced by the infants of each
sex in each condition. In parentheses is the percentage of the total
number of infants of each sex who smiled in each condition.
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TABLE 18
Number of smiles produced by the infants of each sex in each condition.
(Percentage of the total number of infants cf each sex who smiled, in
parentheses).
Condition P. M.
1 10 (42.9) 9 (40)
2 13 (50) 22 (90)
3 28 (71.4) 36 (80)
4 46 (85.7) 43 (90)
Table 19 shows the mean latency, and Table 20 the mean duration of smiles
in each condition by each sex, in minutes, seconds and hundredths of a
second.
TABLE 19
Mean latency of smiles in each condition by each sex, in seconds and











1 25.38 24.17 23.89 17.31 n. s.
2 57.44 36.46 75.72 36.52 n.s.
3 29.42 25.46 26.84 24.78 n.s.
4 38.59 41.29 40.08 26.26 n. s.
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3636 X 3636 xx n.s. n.s.
3£3€ 3636 3€3€ 3636
X n.s.
36 p < .025
3SE P < .001
Although the boys' latency for each condition did not differ significantly
from the girls', the differences in latency for each condition were
significantly different for both sexes between Condition II and the
other Conditions. For the girls latency in Condition I also differed
from that in III and 17, and III also differed from 17.
TABLE 20
Mean duration of smiles in each condition by each sex, in seconds










of F and M.
1.87 1.08 .095 0.50 X
II 1.60 1.15 2.45 1.76 n.s.
III 2.48 2.52 4.55 4.06 X
17 2.17 1.29 5.25 2.54 XX
x p < .025
xx p < .01
I2
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test of difference between conditions
2 3 4







x p < .05
x p < .005
xx p < .001
In every Condition except 2 the duration of smiles was significantly
different between the sexes. While the only significant difference
between conditions for girls was that between durations in Conditions 2
and 3, for boys all differences in duration between Conditions were
significant except between Conditions 2 and 3*
Table 21 shows the different percentages of girls& and boys' smiles





































































































































































































































xx xx xx df = 3
x p < .005
xx xx xx p < .001
xx xx xx df = 9







FIGURE 9 : TYPICAL SMILES FROM TWO INFANT GIRLS
IN THE FOUR CONDITIONS
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Clearly, then, the infants produced different forms of smiling in
each condition, and the girls' smiles were different from those cf the
"boys (see Figure 9 and Figure 10). In general, the more the infants
crinkled their eyes, curled up their lips and opened their mouths, and
put their heads hack, the more intense the smiles seemed. Of interest
is the fact that one particular behaviour was noted most frequently in
Conditions 3 and 4. This behaviour was closing the eyes and
simultaneously turning away from the stimulus at the end of a smile.
None of the smiles in Condition 1, 5.71% in Condition 2, 7.31% in
a-t
Condition 3> and 15.91% of smiles in Condition 4 termined thus.
Discussion
Quantitative conparisons of the smiling observed in this study does
not lend support to any of the hypotheses about the ontogenesis of
smiling described above. None of the hypotheses would predict that
infants would smile most often at the stranger. The non-social
Conditions (1 and 2) were far less effective than the social Conditions
(3 and 4) for both sexes. It must be noted here, however, that there
is no means of knowing exactly what the infants were smiling at in a
particular condition. It might be argued that the time constraint left,
too little time for the infants to detect the contingency in Condition 1;
but the impression remained that many of the infants had detected the
contingency, as judged by their stilling, interested facial expressions
and increase in arm movement.
It could be argued that since the mothers and stranger were trying
to elicit smiles, that they provided reinforcement for smiling contingently,
either by smiling themselves or in some other fashion. The fact that
the stranger was smiled at more often than the mother, and that the






FIGURE 10: TYPICAL SMILES FROM TWO INFANT BOYS
IN THE FOUR CONDITIONS
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not correct.
The number of responses in Condition 2 was also low. The difference
in number of smiles between girls and boys is accounted for by 'the fact
that one infant (a boy) smiled eleven times in this condition. Boys were
more likely than girls to smile in this condition, however. The infants
all seemed very interested in the dots, but did not seem to find them
particularly amusing. Ahren's study (1954) in which he showed that eye-
like dots were the most effective elicitors up until 12 weeks of age was
carried out with institutionalised subjects. Differences in amount of
social stimulation received between his sample and mine may well account
for the disparity between our results.
The mother (Condition 3) elicited far more smiles from infants of
both sexes than Conditions 1 and 2 did. This result supported Piaget's
(1952) and Kagan et al's (1966) position on the smile as a response to
familiar stimuli, but the finding that the stranger (Condition 4) was
even more effective than the mother did not. More of the infants
of both sexes smiled more often at the stranger than at any other
stimulus. This result is contradictory to Wolff's (19&3) claim that
strangers were only as effective as mothers (although neither he nor
the mothers ever smiled in his study), and to Bowlby's claim (1969)
that by three months of age mothers were more effective. It may be
that Bower's (1977t) explanation cf attachment through communication
routines of increased specificity is relevant here. Only seven of the
infants had an older sibling; and so the mothers' experience of
infants was likely to be much less than mine. I may over years of
infant observation have learned more routines cf communication than
the first-time mother of a six week old infant has had time to do.
The results of the analysis of duration and intensity support Polak
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et. al's (1964) finding that infant smiles at three months were quicker
and longer to social (real face) than to non-social (photograph of
face) stimuli, since the social stimuli in this experiment were-'smiled
at faster and f<xr longer than the non-social stimuli.
The results of the qualitative analysis of the smile indicates
that there are differences in form between the smiles in the different
conditions, and so the hypothesis that infants smile differently in
different situations is confirmed. The dimensions of these
differences are not clear, but it seems that smiles to social stimuli
(Conditions 3 • and 4) are characterised by far more eye crinkling,
mouth curling, and mouth extension horizontally, than the smiles to
non-social stimuli (Conditions 1 and 2); in addition the mouth is
opened vertically to a greater extent in social than non-social
Conditions.
The findings on sex differences are difficult to interpret.
That boy infants smiled more often and more intensely at social stimuli
than girls did is surprising, given that we know that the primiparous
mothers of girl infants smile at them more often than the primiparous
mothers of boys smile at their infants (Thoman et al 1972).
Ihether the differences between girls' and boys' smiles to mothers
and the differences between those smiles and the smiles elicited by the
stranger arise through mothers and strangers smiling in different ways
to boys and girls, or reflect se_x differences in the perception cf and
response to mothers and strangers cannot be ascertained from this study.
In the next Chapter I will present evidence that suggests that the




, The observation that adults often smile at infants and infants
smile back, that infants smile at adults and adults almost invariably
smile back, is not considered as constituting evidence of imitation.
Although Piaget considered smiling a form of pseudo-imitation,
he did not believe there was any intentional convergence between the
infant and adult smiles on the infant's part, nor any realisation of
that convergence. The infant merely learned though reinforcement to
produce that particular response to that particular stimulus (Piaget
1936/S).
Freedman (1964) dismissed any possible role for imitation in the
development of smiling by reference to Piaget's finding that deferred
imitation is not possible until the second year of life. From his own
and others' observations of blind and deaf-blind children he concluded
that smiling was innate.
The ability to smile is in all probability innate and does not
depend for its occurrence on exposure to a modeljas Darwin proposed
many years ago (1872). The only experiment which might have proved
this conclusively was seriously flawed (Dennis, 1935), but: it is to
be hoped no one will ever attempt to replicate it. Dennis and his
wife brought up two infants in conditions of minimal stimulation.
Neither he nor his wife were supposed to have smiled in the infants'
presence until they were 48 days old. The infants did however smile
in the period between the beginning of the experiment and the age of
48 days. The experiment did not begin until they were 3& days old,
however, and so it seems most unlikely the infants had never seen an
adult smile.
111.
Even if the ability to smile at all is innate, the form of the smile,
particularly the social smile, may be learned, possibly through imitation.
Before discussing the possible effect of imitation in Experiment VIII,
which may have been responsible for qualitative differences between
the smiles to different stimuli in that euqperiment, I will present the
normative data on the development of the form of the smile.
Unfortunately most of the classic studies were carried out with
institutionalised infants; Wolff's observations (196 3>) of normal
infants are thus most interesting, although he used only a very small
number of very precocious infants, and had no recourse to film of
videotape records to facilitate analysis of his observations.
Development of the Smile in Sighted Infants
Early, non-elicited smiling .
Premature infants and neonates have been observed to produce smiles
in the absence of any known stimulation (Spitz and Wolf 194-6, Wolff 1963).
Emde and Koenig (1969) have shown that these are not caused by wind, as
old wives' tales would have it, but occur almost exclusively during REM
sleep, particularly when the eyes are first closed. Wolff's (1963)
observations confirm this. These smiles decrease in frequency with
age (Spitz et al 1970). Wolff (1963) has described the form of the
smile in the following terms:
"The mouth stretches sidewards and upwards bilaterally ...
the orbicularis oris and other superficial muscles cf the
mouth are symmetrically involved while the rest of the
face is relatively undisturbed. The circular superficial
muscles around the eyes do not contract, and there is none
of the crinkling at the corners of the eyes which will later
characterise the smile".
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Ambrose (19&9) ^as also rioted unilateral movement of the lips.
According to Freedman (1974) not all neonates are observed to
engage in non-elicited smiling (though this may be a result of 'in¬
sufficient observation) but infants who smile frequently at this
stage also smile frequently later in life.
Socially-elicited smiling
As mentioned above, the emergence of "social" smiles, i.e. those
which occur in response to social stimuli, has been considered to be
under genetic control; but the amount of social stimulation the infant
receives may be a factor. Wolff has described the form of the social
smile in these terms:
"... The eyes are bright and focused, the orbicularis oculis
muscles obviously contract and contribute the characteristic
crinkling around the eyes: The mouth is pulled far to the
sides and upwards and may be open, giving the appearance
of a grin rather than a smile".
Stimuli eliciting social smiles
Despite the many studies of stimuli sufficient to produce smiling,
I know of none which directly compared moving non-smiling human faces
and moving smiling human faces in effectiveness in eliciting smiling
from young infants or uneliciting different forms of smiles. Spitz
and Wolf (194b) found at the youngest age studied (1 month), that
infants smiled more to faces than to other stimuli: but although the
face model presented either smiled or nodded, the results are not
presented in such a way that the relative effectiveness of these
movements can be assessed. A grimacing face wassupposed to be as
effective as a smiling one; but I believe from examination of the
illustration of the grimacing face that, since the lips were elongated
and turned up at the edges, it could have been interpreted as a smile.
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Kempe and Kempe (1978) have observed that abused children do not smile
spontaneously, for reasons which are unknown but might be obvious.
Possible effect of imitation
The first point to make from these descriptions is that the smiles
elicited in Conditions 1 and 2 of Experiment VIII were more like early,
non-elicited smiling than were those elicited in Conditions 3 and l+»
For example, eye-crinkling was observed in only 78% of smiles of
Conditions 1 and 2, but 91.5% of smiles in Conditions 3 and 4. Since
the nomnal social smile of adults always involves eye crinkling, this
may reflect the effect of imitation.
If there were any imitation of smiling, then the variation between
the form of infant smiles to the mothers should be much greater than
the variation between the form cf smiles to the stranger.
The mothers would be likely to produce a far greater range of form
of smile than the stranger could. If this were so, then we might expect
that the percentage of smiles to the mother exhibiting a certain
characteristic of form would be lower than the percentage of smiles
to the stranger exhibiting that characteristic.
Using the sign test, I analysed the results for boys' and girls*
smiles to mother and stranger shown in Table 21. The prediction made
was that the percentage of smiles to stranger in which a certain
characteristic of form was apparent would be greater than the percentage
of smiles to mother in which that characteristic was apparent. The null
hypothesis was that there would be no difference. The results for girls
was significant, indicating more variability in the smiles to mothers
_ 10, x = 2, p ^ .055). The result for boys was not significant
(N = 10, x = 6, n.s.). There is some evidence, then, that girls may
have been imitating the form of the smiles they observed. However,
without evidence as to the form the mothers' and strangers' smiles
actually took, it could equally well be the case that female infants
show more variability in the smiles they give mothers than those they give
strangers, irrespective of the form of the smiles the mothers and
strangers produce.
BLIND INFANTS' SMILES
In the absence of any evidence from cross-cultural studies of
imitation in smiling, one test of the hypothesis that the form at
smiles is at least partly imitated could be made in the comparison
of blind and sighted infants' smiles.
Development of the smile in blind infants
At least one investigator (Freedman 1974) has concluded that smiling
is innate, on the basis of evidence from blind infants. However,
Thompson (1941) concluded from a study of blind infants' smiles that
lack of opportunity for imitation prevented their from attaining the
normal form. Unfortunately, she filmed only two of her 26 subjects
in the first year of life. At seven weeks the smile of a congenitally
blind infant was described as "a barely perceptible retraction of the
corners of the mouth". Another infant was observed at the ages of
11 and 12 months. The smile he produced at 11 months consisted
in opening the mouth and partly closing the eyes, presumably also
there was horizontal extension, since the naso-labial fold became
prominent; but there was no curling up at the corners. Thompson
included a photograph of this smile, which does seem to involve some
eye-crinkling. The same infant's smile at 12 months cf age was
characterised by the mouth curling up at the corners and extending
vertically slightly; again the mouth extended horizontally and the
eyes were partially closed. Thompson describes the shape of the mouth
as "elliptical". Slight eye-crinkling is apparent from the photograph
provided. This subject had however been blinded after birth, at the
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age of five months. The photographs provided show that these smiles
were much less intense than the smiles the much younger infants in my
study provided; but the eliciting conditions of Thompson's blind
infants' smiles are not recorded.
However Freedman (1964) had to allow that vision facilitated smiling,
since his blind subject did not exhibit "prolonged smiling" until the
age of 5 0r 6 months. He noted in a report on a congenitally blind
infant that at the age of 2 months 13 days, the infant's smiles
"while beautiful, were not normal. They seemed to be a
series of reflexes firing in rapid succession, so that they
appeared and then faded rapidly".
By 3 months 8 days her smiles were more prolonged, but "still consisted
of a discrete series, i.e. regular twitching at the corners of her mouth".
Freedman's (1964) report gives the most detailed description of
a young blind infant's social smiles, and it is striking that the form
of those smiles resembles far more that of early non-elicited smiles
than that of social smiling in sighted infants. Freedman has published
a photograph of his subject smiling (1974) and although the reproduction
is appalling eye crinkling does not seem to be present.
Fraberg (1974) concluded from her longitudinal studies of blind
infants that blind infants do not smile as frequently as do sighted
infants. Blind infants produce "muted" smiles; Fraiberg reports that
the "j-oyful" smile of a normal sighted infant rarely occurs in blind
infants.
There does then seem to be evidence that blind infants do not produce
qualitatively similar smiles to those of sighted children, possibly
^^.ndicating that imitation may be involved in their smiling response,
laving access to a large amount of data on blind and severely visually
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impaired infants and childrens* smiles, I decided to apply the same
analysis to these as I had used in Experiment VIII, to see if I could




Assessment of ?orm of Blind. Infants' Smiles
The videotape records of blind and visually handicapped babies1
smiles I analysed were gathered for another purpose, as observations
of their behaviour in the laboratory, before testing the infants with
x
a therapeutic device. No attempts were therefore made to elicit
smiling other than would occur naturally. Their aetiologies were so
different and the results of the analyses so disparate that I shall
present the data on each infant rather than amalgamate it.
METHOD
Subjects
Subject A: The cause of blindness in this six month old girl was
bilateral anopthalmia. Her general condition was excellent, and
her motor development above average.
Subject B: The cause of blindness in this thirteen month old girl
was bilateral anopthalmia. Her general condition and motoric
development were very good, e.g. she could walk with one hand held.
Subject C: The cause of blindness in this thirteen month old boy was
agenesis of the optic tract. His general condition was not good,
e.g. he would rock to and fro and indulge in head banging when left
unstimulated.
Subjects D and E were dizygotic twin boys of normal motor development,
aged 28 months, for whom the cause of visual impairment was Leber's
Congenital Amaurosis. Opthalmoscopic examination revealed that in both
infants the macular areas and optic discs were atrophic; there was no
recordable photopic ERG and only a very slight scoptopic ERG was recorded
(3-4 microvolts instead of the usual 150 - 250 microvolts). Subject E
could however react out and grasp peripherally presented objects; but
s I am grateful to Drs. T.G.R. Bower, I. Neilson and J.G. Wis hart for
their permission to analyse these videotapes.
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Subject D would only reach for large white objects presented at the
extremes of peripheral vision.
Subject F was a thirteen month old girl, in whom Leber's Congenital
Amaurosis had also been diagnosed. Opthalmoscopic records were not
available, but the infant's vision was obviously very poor. She would
only reach for small pieces of white paper presented peripherally.
Procedure
This was different for all the infants depending on infant state and
parental inclination. 30 minutes of observation was made of each child
playing with toys and interacting socially with adults, and in the case
of D and E observation of their normal behaviour at home with their
parents and sibling was also made.
Scoring the tapes
The criteria adopted for scaring the occurrence of a smile were as
used in Experiment VIII. Recordings of vocalisation were invaluable in
scoring, as without the soundtrack it was difficult to discriminate between
smiling and crying. Smiles occurring during social interaction were
easiest to score, as tne efrecc on the adult was obvioussmiles in non-
social situations were extremely difficult to assess, and it. may be that
some grimaces which were smiles have been excluded from this analysis,
simply because none of the usual criteria could encompass them. The
qualitative analysis was as used in Experiment VIII.
RESULTS
Table 22 shows the results of the analysis of the smiles ODserved.
in the infants "Eyes close" was obviously not a component of these smiles
in infants without eyes, and "Look away" for those infants meant "turn
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































FIGURE 11 : SUBJECT B SMILING
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DISCUSSION
The eliciting conditions were so different and the degree of
visual acuity present in the infants who were partially sighted was
so difficult to gauge that strong conclusions cannot be drawn from
this study. The evidence in Table 23 does indicate that the
visually handicapped children produced more intense smiles, as
shown by the fact that their smiles were lengthier and involved
more eye crinkling, and that their mouths were opened wider
vertically and extended horizontally more frequently. Comparison
of these results with those shown in Table 21 indicates that these
smiles were not, however, as intense as those produced by very much
younger sighted infants. Some of the smiles, particularly those
produced by Subject B, looked very bizarre, incorporating as they
did characteristics not observed in the smiles of any other infant
either sighted or blind, e.g. knitting the brows while smiling.
That this subject could produce more normal smiles is shown in
Figure 11.
Fraiberg's observation (1974) that the smiles of blind infants
are "muted" is supported by this study. The smiles were however
not discrete series of twitches as reported oy Freeoman (1974J in
a younger subject. However, in the blind infants the level of
eye crinkling observed was so low and the degree of mouth extension
vertically so small that it may be hypothesised that these aspects
of social smiles are learned, as may be moving the head back and
hand to mouth movements during smiling. That extremely visually
impaired infants showed more normal smiling, even though none of them
could probably see anything more than 12 inches away, suggests to me
that this is learned through observation of others' smiles at close
range, possibly through imitation.
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IMITATION AND SMILING- : A SUMMARY
The results of Experiment VIII confirm Carpenter's (1975) finding
of infant discrimination between different adult's faces, long
before the age of six months. In addition that Experiment indicated
that infants can discriminate between social and non-social stimuli,
as indexed by their smiling more frequently and intensely to the
former than the latter. The results of Experiment IX suggests that
vision is necessary for full expression of the social smile, since
the smiles of blind and visually impaired infants were different in
form from those of sighted younger infants. It cannot be
determined from these studies if imitation plays any part in the
development of the smile, as Thompson (1941) suggested. Sighted
infants generally receive immediate reinforcement for smiling at an
adult who has smiled at them. This reinforcement will often
consist in continued smiling on the adult's part, but many other
behaviours indicating approbation may be displayed. Blind infants
by contrast are less likely to receive immediate reinforcement of
smiling. It could also be argued that parents of blind infants
are likely to reinforce all the infrequent smiles they see, and
so may not shape the infant's smile as the parents of sighted
infants do. This is suggested by the finding of anomalous features
in Subject B's smiles in Experiment IX.
Evidence of discrimination of features
The smiling studies do however indicate the discrimination of
adult features is not impossible for young infants, as might be
suggested by the classic studies of smiling. Carpenter's study,
alluded to above, showed that by 2 weeks of age infants could
discriminate between the mother's and a stranger's face, when these
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were presented sequentially (Carpenter, 1975). Discrimination
was evident on the first fixation, indicating that this did not
take place on the basis of differential movement by the mothers
and strangers.
Wilcox and Clayton (1968) were unable to show that 5 month
old infants could discriminate between films of smiling, frowning
and neutral expressions when total fixation time was measured.
More recently, however, Young-Browne et al (1977) have produced
contrary evidence. Using an habituation paradigm, they compared
the responses of three month old infants to sad, surprised and
happy expressions in the same model, presented on slides. Infants




Imitation and Representation : An overview
Although the results reported in this thesis concerning
representation in older children were negative, and so must be treated
with due caution, some of the experiments on imitation were positive.
The relation of imitation to representation in Piaget's theory has
already been described. Possible implications of the experimental
results obtained for that theory and for those others outlined in
Chapter I will be discussed below.
Imitation in young infants
The positive results I report on imitation in young infants have
been independently confirmed (Maratos, 19735 Melzoff and Moore, 1977).
However, these positive results were limited to particular facial move¬
ments; more gross bodily movement was not imitated. That infants are
able to make some of the fine discriminations necessary for facial
imitation the results of the smiling studies suggest.
The difficulties inherent in any study of imitation in young infants
are legion, as I hope I have made clear, and easy interpretation of
results is impossible. The criteria by which an act was classed as
imitative were the strong criteria of
(1) A clear antecedent-consequent relation between model and subject's
behaviour must be reliably demonstrable.
(2) That that consequent should be unique to that antecedent model,
i.e. another model could not reliably produce the same consequent, and
(3) Antecedent and consequent must be isomorphic.
Methodological xigour dictates that only relatively coirplete
reolications of the model's movement are allowed to be considered as
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imitation. Approximations, of whatever nature, can not be accepted
as imitation. Accordingly the antecedents of any progression in
imitation of, for example, tongue protrusion, are not clearly discernible.
The product of imitation, the complete replication of an act, if taken
as the only proof of imitation, cannot elucidate the process.
The implications of these results on young infants' ability to
imitate for Piaget's theory of imitative development are thus limited.
Piaget's theory describes the process of imitative development are not
merely the products. I will discuss below an alternative explanation
of the forces operating in imitative development, after consideration
of the negative results of experiments on imitation in older infants.
If the phenomenon is however true imitation in younger infants, and
not "pseudo-imitation" how can it in Piaget's terms take place before the
co-ordination of schemas, which characteristically does not appear
until Stage IV in the general evolution of intelligence? Bower et al.
(1970b) have suggested that Piaget may have been wrong in believing that
the schemas of, for example, vision and touch, had to be co-ordinated
one with the other through assimilation and accommodation through
experience. Bower et al's experiment indicates that this co-ordination
is innate, or at least learned in the first few days of life. Given the
evidence that reaching and grasping are present in neonates (Bower et al.
1970b) that foetuses suck their fingers before birth (Liggins, 1972) and
that young infants close their eyes when objects are moved towards them,
we could conclude that the schemas of hand movement, mouth movement and
eye blinking are familiar ones for the very young infant. In that case,
why should imitation of hand movement, mouth movement and eye blinking not be
possible, since Piaget believes that imitation of any act can take place
when the infant has already formed a schema of that action and practised
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it, and so is able to assimilate the model to that schema. The problem
of how the infant could form a schema of an action he cannot see himself
make would still remain.
The results of the experiments reported do not lend support to
Bower's theory of development.
That theory, in which he proposes that infants move from abstract
to specific representations of perceived events, would not allow for
precise imitation in early infancy. If infants were to represent the
mother's movement in an abstract form it would surely be in Bower's
classification "something is moving" and not as specific as " a tongue
is being protruded" or "mouth is being opened" until later in
development.
Had I found evidence similar to Gardner and Gardner's (1970)
observations of opening and closing the wrong part of the body in a
six week old infant, similar to the errors Piaget (1945/62) described,
then this would have supported Bower's theory. However, I did not
observe any such errors in my experiments, which is not to say that
they did not occur. As I have discussed above, my interest lay
primarily in correct replications. Any such errors could be of varied
nature, e.g. infants might have been moving their toes when the finger
movement model was presented. Apart from the near impossibility of
recording every infant's every movement without having the subjects naked
throughout the experiments, I consider the evidence that such movements
are imitative to be weak. Gardner and Gardner (1970) presented four
models, two In/Out in mode (tongue protrusion, finger extension) and two
Open/Close in mode (hand open and shut, mouth open and shut). Apart
from direct evidence of imitation of two of these movements, (tongue
protrusion and hand opening and closing) they also analysed erroneous
response and concluded that the infant was more likely to produce a
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response in the correct than the incorrect mode, e.g. opening and
shutting the mouth when the hand was opened and closed, rather than
protruding the tongue. However, the table of response they provide
shews that the In/Out models elicited 7 In/Out responses and 4 Open/
Close responses; the Open/Close models elicited 5 In/C-ut responses
and 8 Open/Close responses, including direct imitation of the model.
Since 11 out of the total of 24 responses were tongue protrusion, I
believe their conclusions to be unjustified. Piaget's observations
were made by eye, and it is impossible to discern all the movements
an infant makes and record them at the same time. The "errors"
I observed were in my opinion approximate attempts at imitation, with
the correct part of the body, e.g. bringing two hands instead of one to
the mouth in Experiment IV.
If in the course of development, infants do move from abstract
to specific representations of perceived stimuli then one would
expect an increase in imitative ability over time, and not as has been
found (Maratos 1973) a seeming decrease in this ability for particular
acts.
Imitation in older infants
The results of Experiment V were negative, in that older infants
generally could not imitate a novel act, although it was one the infants
could see themselves make. This result is in accord with the theories
Piaget, Bruner and Bower have proposed. Piaget and Bruner would not
allow that infants could represent to themselves such a model. The
specificity of thought required might not yet be sufficiently developed,
in Bower's theory. The results are interesting however for their
bearing on imitation in younger infants. (Given reinforcement verbally,
visually and aurally, the children were still unable to imitate reliably
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a simple movement they could see themselves make. This finding weakens
the case for the imitation of unseen complex face movement in even
younger infants in terms of subtle conditioning.
That the older infants' failure is a result of a deficit in memory
is unlikely, given all the evidence for long-term memory in infants of
this age. Is it then the case that younger infants are better able
to represent observed movement, and therefore reproduce it, than are
older infants, or the fact that the tasks presented to the infants differ
in terms of familiarity the reason for the younger infants' competence?
The finding that one infant could imitate the required actions lends
support to the latter hypothesis, and I shall return to this question.
Representation
The results of the experiments investigating representation in
the secondcfefinition I employed, as an understanding that one thing
can stand for another, are not in accord with Piaget's observations on
this ability in infants. Competent as the children undoubtedly were in
representation as first defined, the evocation of absent images,
developed though the semiotic function was as implied by their linguistic
development, representation in this second use of the term was far from
advanced. The older children did not seem to be able to solve the
problem until they were able to attach verbal labels to the representation,
although certain of the problems could have been solved by direct
imitation.
The results of Experiments VI - VIII are not in accord with Bruner's
position. Bruner would allow that the older infant in Stage VI of
cognitive development could know something through a picture of it.
Although he has emphasised that recognition of a picture does not imply
the ability to perform the act it represents, to "know something through
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a picture or image of it" (Bruner 1966) implies more than mere recognition.
The ability to recognise pictures is in any case present by 5 months of
age, if we accept Pagan's (1972) finding that infants preferred a novel photograph
of a face to one they had been t?/o weeks previously. These photographs
were presented simultaneously, using the paired comparison technique.
Whether the infants were recognising the photograph as a face cannot be
determined, but the ability to discriminate a novel from a familiar
picture suggests that the latter was recognised. Bruner disagrees with
Piaget that the growth of representational ability is stage-like, and
believes instead thsb it consists in successive mastery of the three forms
of representation he distinguishes. There is partial translation af
each of these forms into its successor. That children did not seem to be
able to solve these problems without access to symbolise representation
supports Bruner's position.
The results of Experiments VI - VIII do however accord with Bower's
theory. Children should have developed representational capacity to a
level at which they could specify the relations of objects in a
representation to such an extent that they can act on the basis of those
relations, particularly if they can specify those relations verbally.
Imitation and Representation
The positive finding of imitation in young infants seems to be the
most challenging result for the theories of representation discussed.
Above I described possible explanations of this phenomenon, none of which
seem to be entirely sufficient. Thus, explanations in terms of operant
conditioning or associative learning cannot account for the wide diversity
in individual performance, nor the limitation of imitation to facial
movement. If operant conditioning was instrumental in producing these
responses, then the learning which took place was extremely rapid - more
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rapid, than is usual with this age range of infants. Nor can imitative
performance be a purely reflexive act, as is walking in the newborn;
not only does it fail to decline as other such reflexive acts usually
do, it does not seem to be reliably elicited in all infants, as such
acts usually are. The variability of individual performance also
militates against ethological concepts of fixed action patterns as
explanations of imitation.
If it is allowed that imitation, albeit of a limited range of
models, is present from an early age, then how is this imitation achieved?
Imitative performance
Trevarthen (1975) has proposed that the infant has an innate model
of his own and others' bodies, and is able to map the movements of others
on to his own body and reproduce the movement. It is this position
which Moore and Melzoff (1977) also maintain. However, as I have
suggested earlier, if this general competence is present from birth, it
is surprising that the performance of individual infants is so variable.
Until strong evidence of imitation of body movement other than facial
movement is produced, it seems that it would be more parsimonious to
limit this innate knowledge of isomorphism to facial models. Jirari's
finding that 10 minute old infants preferentially followed schematic
representations of whole faces, rather than of scrambled symmetrical or
assymmetrical representations or blank faces may be relevant here (Jirari,
1976). Studies of infant preference for face-like representations are
notoriously difficult to evaluate, since full consideration of such
variables as complexity, brightness constancy etc, is not always achieved.
Nevertheless, the infants were so young that this finding may indicate
that some model for faces is innate.
Piaget believed that the infant must learn that isomorphism existed
between himself and others before he could imitate models of actions he could
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not himself make. The fact that the infants in my studies did not
immediately reproduce others' actions perfectly, instead making slight
errors, of e.g. pushing the tongue against the lips when the mouth
model was presented, supports this position. Piaget considered that
"mutual imitation" was necessarily involved in this learning. There
is now evidence that mothers consistently imitate their infants, which
I shall now outline.
. MacFarlane (1975) in six transcrips of mothers' behaviour immediately
after delivery (collected for another purpose) noted four instances of
mothers imitating their infants - in one case, interestingly, of eye
blinking. That mothers of eight week old infants frequently imitated
their movements was observed by Trevarthen (1975) and Papousek and Papousek (1977)
also reported instances of mothers imitating infants. They observed that
facial movements were most likely to be imitated in the first days after
delivery. In a longitudinal study of infants' and mothers' imitative
behaviour Pawlby (1977) observed that mothers' frequently imitated their
infants, while infant imitation of the mother was not so common. The
infants were between 1+ and 10 months of age. Of interest is the fact
that mothers imitated infants' acts with approximately the same frequency
during the study, while the frequency of infants imitating mothers increased
during this time. Forty-nine different activities were imitated by
mother or by child, with speech sounds being most frequently imitated
throughout the study. There was an increase with age in the amount of
imitations involving manual movements and movements with objects, and a
decrease in imitation of facial movements. Pawlby noted individual
differences between pairs of mothers and infants; e.g. some mothers and
infants imitated activities involving toys more frequently than they imitated
speech sounds.
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If mutual imitation of infant by mother does take place, could
it lead to true imitation in the very young infant, as Piaget has
described as occurring in older infants?
Papousek and Papousek (1977) believe that it could not. Although
they allow that the mother, in imitating her infant and thus providing
him with contingent stimulation facilitates the development of
imitation, they still maintain that the first such imitation shown
will be of sounds. The infant will not be able to learn the
correspondence of his facial features and those of others until later.
Evidence that infants detect the contingent nature of mutual imitation
is also offerred. Papousek and Papousek claim that infants often
smile when mothers imitate their movement, but do not smile when
merely presented with her models. I would dispute this very strongly,
as some infants in my studies smiled when the mother first presented
a movement, before they had imitated it themselves.
Given the evidence for imitation in the young infant, and that of
mutual imitation of child by mother, I believe it would be more
parsimonious to consider imitative development as a process of learning,
perhaps with some particular facial movements somehow privileged, than
as action on the basis of innate knowledge of isomorphism. The
importance of imitation in social interaction I shall discuss below.
If early imitation is acquired through learning, then what is the nature
of the reinforcement for that learning? A consideration of this topic
may, in addition provide clues to the nature of representation involved
in such imitation.
One hypothesis is that infants find making the match between the
actions of others and their own is in itself reinforcing. The problem
of how the infant knows that the match has been made still remains.
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Innate mechanisms of recognition of isomorphism must be invoked to
support this hypothesis. It presumes that the infants can learn how
to produce the correct response, and having done so recognises it as
such through an innate ability to detect the similarity. If an
infant who had never protruded its tongue or seen a tongue protruded
in its life were to reproduce this action on the first occasion it
was modelled, then this hypothesis could well be correct.
An alternative hypothesis would be that there is some external
consequence to making the match. As I have discussed above, Watson (1966)
makes a powerful argument for contingency detection as the basis of social
intercourse in infancy. If the mother imitates the infant, and the
infant detects the contingent nature of her action, then this detection
could reinforce the likelihood of the infant's repeating his action,
and then the mother repeating hers, leading eventually to a seeming
imitation. However, in Melzoff and Moore's study (1977) it was
impossible for the model to act in any way contingent on the infant's
actions, and yet imitation still took place. This hypothesis would
therefore require that the infants somehow generalise a response they
made to a previous model, perhaps the mother, to a new model. It is
certainly true that mothers imitate infants extraordinarily frequently
(Pawlby, 1977)• Individual differences are apparent in infants'
imitation. It may be then that such generalisation is possible, but
that these individual differences reflect the vagaries of individual
experience is not yet clear. If infants who had never been exposed to
a mouth opening model were less likely to imitate that model when it was
first presented then were infants shown such a model previously, then the
evidence for such an hypothesis would be stronger. The obvious
impossibility of performing such an experiment points up the difficulties
1U.
in production of any convincing explanation of early imitation on the
data so far available. In any case on this hypothesis there would be no
necessity for the consequent act to be isomorphic with the antecedent
model, as is necessary on the strong criteria of imitation, or for
that antecedent to be unique in eliciting that consequent reliably.
The only necessary condition is that the mother's action is contingent
on the infant's, and as the timing analysis in Expe riment IV showed,
mother's and infant's behaviour was to some extent synchronised.
However, this was also presumably true in those conditions where imitation
was not observed. As yet it has not been shown that an infant through
contingent reinforcement will reliably produce a movement completely
dissimilar from that of the model as easily as that movement is produced
under the same reinforcement of an isomorphic model. Given the evidence
of the difficulty of eliciting reliable imitation in young infants it seems
to me that if what seems to be imitation is a product of this form of
learning then it is a special form of such learning, in which the
isomorphism of the contingent acts if not immediately very soon "becomes
important. Obviously, a mother will not reinforce by immediate
repetition of an infant's acts those which are not appropriate to her
own behaviour, and acts isomorphic to her own must frequently be
appropriate. That negative reinforcement is effective in eliminating
undesirable mouth movement is shown by a study describing the success of
a mother in reducing tongue protrusion in her Down's Syndrome infant
(Numata, 1975).
How would either of these hypothesis account for the emergence cf
new behaviours? On the view that recognition of isomorphism is given,
the emergence of new behaviours is presumably a matter of increasing
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motor skill. Certainly, in my view the implications for imitative
development of increasing motor skill have been neglected. A two
year old child cannot thread a needle, no matter how many times he is
shown how to do so, although we may be sure he has a very well developed
knowledge of isomorphism. Why moving the arm in a particular way
rather that a part of the face should be more difficult could be
explained in terms of the importance for young infants of precise facial
movement - in nursing, etc., - and the relative unimportance of, and
probably motor capacity for, precise arm movement. The neural
representation of lip and tongue movement is likely to be greater than
that of arm movement in the young infant, as in the adult.
The learning hypothesis, in its original form, where isomorphism is
not a prerequisite, must necessitate a two-stage development. The first
would be of early non-intentional or representative imitation; '£he later
of "true" imitation, reminiscent of Valentine's (1930) theory. Obviously
infants eventually attempt new acts in imitation which they have never
before spontaneously produced, and for which they can not therefore have
been contingently reinforced. Relying as I did on strong criteria of
imitation, to establish the evidence for its existence rather than any
development of the ability, any transition between for example opening the
mouth to that same model in seeming and in true imitation cannot be
ascertained from these studies. On the evidence of Melzoff and Moore
(1977), I would argue that it must indeed be one which takes place very
early in the infant's life.
Imitation and social interaction
That seeming infant imitation is more easily elicited to facial
movements suggests that this ability may be of important social consequence.
The evidence from the blind infants studied indicates that lack of oppor-
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tunity to see others' facial expressions, may prevent full expressions
of the smiling response.
It may be that the decrement in imitation of facial movement noted
by some investigators (Maratos, 1973 > Pawlby 1977) reflects shaping of
behaviour by the mother. Obviously, tongue protrusion is socially
unacceptable in infants past a certain age; there is some suggestion
modifiable
that this behaviour is/as described above. With increasing age it is
clear that the range of behaviours imitated correspondingly increases
(Pawlby, 1977); this increase may reflect increasing maternal fostering
of imitation, (and motor development) and not the steady progress of
representational ability. The individual variability observed may
result from the variation in mothers' propensity to encourage specific
imitations.
The importance of imitation in social interaction, and any effects
of social reinforcement of whatever nature, has yet to be established.
I would suggest, however, that it is in this area of study that the
function of imitation might well be discerned.
Imitation does not seem to parallel representational ability, as
Piaget believed. If infants can imitate movements of unseen parts of
the body before they can imitate movements of seen parts of the body, then
the distinction between these movements made in terms cf difficulty of
representation may not be valid. If the observations of Experiments VI
and VII were to be replicated, then it would indicate that representational
ability in the first sense, evocation of absent objects, may not confer
the ability to represent in the second sense, that of understanding that
one thing can stand for another.
If early infant imitation is a real phenomenon, results of the
experiments reported here and Melzoff and Moore's (1977) findings are
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verified, then will the nature of the underlying representation ever
be discernible? It seems to me that the requirement of immediate
repetition of novel movement seen some time previously, which Piaget
(1945/62) considered the apogee of infant representational ability, could
never be demonstrated in very young infants, for ethical and practical
reasons. That children eventually attain this ability is obvious, and
so there must be some development in imitation, if not as a function of
increasing representational ability. I think it not unlikely that
this development is a function of social reinforcement of imitation
performed for its own sake, in mutually rewarding interaction. Imeultures
less technologically inclined than our own, infants have been observed
to imitate most of the actions their parents produce in everyday life
(Konners, 1972; Turnbull, 1976). In play they learn the skills of
adulthood - of hunting, cooking, and so on - through imitation; and are
much encouraged in this imitation by their parents. Early imitation
may be an epiphenomenon of social intercourse, but it may develop into
a real vehicle of learning, through social reinforcement.
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